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State debt crises are an underappreciated driving force in 
American constitutional history. The Revolutionary War debts of the 
1790s gave us Chisholm v. Georgia,1 the Eleventh Amendment,2 and 
one of the first great debates over the scope of the national 
government’s power—Alexander Hamilton’s controversial proposal 
to assume the states’ debts.3 The Reconstruction debts gave us a new 
and improved Eleventh Amendment, reinterpreted to bar federal 
question claims in Hans v. Louisiana,4 as well as a dress rehearsal for 
the Court’s freedom of contract cases in the Lochner era.5 And as 
Michael Greve’s paper for this symposium demonstrates, the way that 
the central government responds (or doesn’t respond) to state debt 
crises is a critical factor in determining the practical scope of 
subnational autonomy in any federal system.6 
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This essay was prepared for the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy symposium 
on “The Consequences and Constitutional Dilemmas of State Debt,” held at the Duke 
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opportunity to participate, to Michael Greve, Martin Lipton, John Orth, and Adam Feibelman 
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 1.  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of 
a contract suit by a private citizen against a state). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
 3.  See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800, at 118–23 (1993). 
 4.  134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 5.  See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Rehearsal for Substantive Due Process: The Municipal Bond 
Cases, 53 TEX. L. REV. 738 (1975). 
 6.  See Michael S. Greve, Our Federalism is not Europe’s. It’s Becoming Argentina’s., 7 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 39 (2012) [hereinafter Greve, Argentina] (“The 
fundamental fiscal federalism dilemma is between a credible central commitment against 
bailouts and central control over subordinate governments’ fiscal affairs.”). We strongly urged 
our friend Professor Greve to call his paper “Don’t Cry for Me, California,” but to no avail. For 
development of the argument that the credibility of central government commitments not to 
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Now we find ourselves in the midst of yet another state debt crisis. 
This essay explores the constitutional issues that may arise as the 
states, their creditors, and the national government seek a way out of 
the current financial tangle. That tangle is complex because states face 
both near-term and long-term fiscal challenges of differing natures.7 
The near-term challenges largely stem from the most recent recession 
and can, for the most part, be characterized as financial distress. The 
long-term challenges arise from pension obligations and healthcare 
costs and can be characterized as economic distress. These two types 
of distress call for different kinds of solutions and thus raise different 
constitutional issues. 
Most states do not face immediate fiscal crises—that is, most 
states can fund their current spending; instead, they face long-term 
challenges due to pension obligations and rising healthcare costs.8 A 
recent study of state debt and future liability, including pension and 
healthcare obligations, found that “in total, states are in debt for $4.2 
trillion.”9 Focusing on pension funding, the Pew Center has concluded 
that “[t]hirty-one states were below the 80 percent funded threshold 
for a well-funded pension system” in fiscal year 2009.10 These looming 
liabilities affect not only the security of the pension and healthcare 
benefits themselves, but the states’ ability to raise money for other 
purposes. As Olivia Mitchell notes,  
 
 
bail out subnational governments is crucial to avoiding pathologies in federal systems, see 
JONATHAN A. RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL 
FEDERALISM (2006); Paul E. Peterson & Daniel Nadler, Freedom to Fail: The Keystone of 
American Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (2012). 
 7.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-495SP, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS’ FISCAL OUTLOOK APRIL 2011 UPDATE (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11495sp.pdf. 
 8.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Miron, The Fiscal Health of U.S. States, Mercatus Center Working 
Paper No. 11-33, Aug. 2011, at 2–3, available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/ 
files/publication/Fiscal_Health_of_the_US_States_Miron_WP1133.pdf (“[S]tate government 
finances are not on a stable path; if spending patterns continue to follow those of recent 
decades, the ratio of state debt to output will increase without bound.”). 
 9.  See Debts of states over $4 trillion: Budget group, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2011, 1:57 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/24/us-usa-states-debt-idUSTRE79N5RX20111024; see 
also Miron, supra note 8, at 10 (concluding that official statements of pension liabilities 
underreported those liabilities by approximately $1.3 trillion as of June 2009). 
 10.  PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE WIDENING GAP: THE GREAT RECESSION’S 
IMPACT ON STATE PENSION AND RETIREE HEALTH CARE COSTS 3, Exh. 1 (Apr. 2011), 
available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2011/Pew_pensions_retiree_ 
benefits.pdf. Illinois was the worst-funded state, with only fifty-one percent of its pension 
obligations funded. Id. 
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financial markets—investors, rating agencies, and insurers—are 
devoting much more attention than ever before to the financing 
demands of public sector pension plans when considering whether 
a state may be able to sustain, and surely to increase, efforts to 
borrow as a means of smoothing the deleterious impact of the 
financial crisis.11 
Some states, however, do face current fiscal emergencies. Illinois, 
for example, has skipped or reduced contributions to pension trust 
funds and expanded future pension benefits without providing 
commensurate funding.12 In 2009, the state issued $3.5 billion of 
general obligation bonds to help fund its 2010 pension contribution, 
and the state remains torn by political disagreement about how to 
deal with public financing.13 Similarly, in 2009, Connecticut had to sell 
a seven-year bond to cover its operating budget.14 And California, 
dubbed the “Lindsay Lohan of states” by The Wall Street Journal,15 
faces a number of short-term (and long-term) challenges. 
When evaluating the challenges facing the states, four categories 
of state obligations are critical: operating deficits, bond debt, 
unfunded pension obligations, and other post-employment benefits 
(largely retiree healthcare benefits).16 These debts are owed to four 
different constituencies: citizens, bond investors, employees, and 
 
 11.  Olivia S. Mitchell, Public Pension Pressures in the United States, in WHEN STATES GO 
BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL 
CRISIS 57 (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012) [hereinafter WHEN STATES GO 
BROKE]. 
 12.  IRIS J. LAV & ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
MISUNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING STATE DEBT, PENSIONS AND RETIREE HEALTH COSTS 
CREATE UNNECESSARY ALARM 13 (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-20-11sfp.pdf. 
 13.  For example, the Illinois State Treasurer has threatened to derail a long-term 
borrowing plan favored by the Governor and members of the legislature by “call[ing] bond 
houses and financial rating firms to outline how deep the state is in debt.” Josh Barro, Illinois 
Treasurer: “Don’t Buy My Bonds”, PUBLIC SECTOR INC. (May 24, 2011, 8:30 AM), 
http://www.publicsectorinc.com/forum/2011/05/illinois-treasurer-dont-buy-my-bonds.html; see 
also George F. Will, Illinois is running out of time and money, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2012), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/illinois-is-running-out-of-time-and-
money/2012/04/25/gIQA7r4khT_story.html (quoting Illinois Governor Pat Quinn to the effect 
that “our rendezvous with reality has arrived”). 
 14.  LAV & MCNICHOL, supra note 12, at 7; see id. (noting that this also occurred in 
Louisiana in 1998 and in Connecticut in 1991). 
 15.  Allysia Finley, California: The Lindsay Lohan of States, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703506904575592612400443370.html. 
 16.  These are described as general fund unreserved balance, net bonded debt, unfunded 
pension benefit obligations, and other post-employment benefits by Loop Capital Markets, 2011 
State Pension Funding Review 20 (2011), available at http://www.wikipension.com/ 
images/0/09/Loop11.pdf. 
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retirees. Our essay looks to the options available to these 
constituencies, as well as to the national government, to maximize 
satisfaction of state obligations in the event that states fail to meet 
them. We consider five potential “failure” scenarios: 
1.  Payment delays and IOUs: States may simply seek to delay 
repayment of their obligations without attempting to diminish 
their ultimate liability, or they may resort—as California and 
Illinois already have—to paying private businesses, local 
governments, and others with short-term IOUs rather than 
real money. 
2.  Alterations to Long-Term Obligations: States in economic 
distress may decide to alter the terms of long-term agreements 
with current and former employees to provide pensions and 
healthcare benefits. 
3.  Bailout: The national government may seek to “bail out” a 
financially troubled state, much like the International 
Monetary Fund might bail out a sovereign debtor or a 
distressed debt lender might lend on an emergency basis to a 
cash-strapped business. If a bailout occurs, the interesting 
questions concern what concessions the national government 
might extract in order to minimize the prospect of recurrence, 
as well as what long-term effects a bailout might have on the 
financial independence of the states. 
4.  Default: “Default” may mean a number of things, including a 
delay in payment or payment in something other than cash (an 
IOU). For purposes of this essay, however, “default” means 
failure to pay principal or interest when due with no clear plan 
of when, if ever, it will be paid. 
5.  Bankruptcy: Though not currently an option for states, scholars 
and politicians have suggested a voluntary bankruptcy regime 
for states, and one of our fellow symposium contributors 
argues for a mandatory regime. 
Although many of the constitutional issues raised by these scenarios 
will overlap, each also raises unique questions of its own. 
Part I of this essay describes and analyzes the fiscal challenges 
currently facing state governments. In the following Parts, we offer a 
constitutional perspective on each of the five sets of options available 
to address the states’ fiscal challenges. In Part II, we consider payment 
delays, IOUs, and alterations to pension and healthcare obligations. 
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Part III addresses bailouts, and Part IV considers default. In Part V, 
we describe constitutional concerns raised by proposed state 
bankruptcy schemes. We cannot hope to offer definitive answers; 
many of the salient issues have never been considered by the 
Supreme Court, and others have not been revisited in over a century. 
We aspire only to flag these questions so that policy discussions may 
be informed by the relevant constitutional background principles. 
I. THE STATES’ FISCAL CHALLENGES 
Financially speaking, the states are a mess. Professor Greve wrote 
last year that “[d]eficits for the current budget cycle are estimated at 
$175 billion. In some states (Texas, California, Nevada, and Illinois), 
the shortfall exceeds 30 percent of projected budgets.”17 The long-term 
picture is considerably worse: “Unfunded pension obligations are 
estimated at upwards of $1 trillion and are probably three or four 
times that amount. Unfunded health care commitments clock in at 
upwards of a half trillion. Bond debt issued by state and local 
governments comes in around $2.8 trillion.”18 
Nor are these problems simply a short-term manifestation of the 
late economic unpleasantness. The United States Government 
Accountability Office notes that the “fiscal position of [the states] will 
steadily decline through 2060 absent any policy changes.”19 The policy 
changes required to maintain fiscal balance at the state level—cutting 
spending and raising taxes—are not politically palatable. And the 
necessary extent of those policy changes—action taken today and 
maintained every year equal to a 12.5% reduction in spending or 
increase in taxes20—makes them nearly politically impossible to 
implement. 
In this fiscal landscape, prudent stakeholders should consider how 
a state may react if (or when) it cannot support its current obligations 
with revenues or borrowing—that is, if it could not pay its debts as 
they came due.21 In the corporate arena, analysts distinguish between 
 
 17.  Michael S. Greve, Bailouts or Bankruptcy: Are States Too Big to Fail?, AM. 
ENTERPRISE INST. LEGAL OUTLOOK 1 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/ 
2011/03/14/LO-2011-03-No-1-g.pdf. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 1. 
 20.  Id. at 2. 
 21.  For a municipality—the only government entity with a bankruptcy option under 
current law—to be eligible for bankruptcy under Chapter 9, it must be unable to meet its 
obligations when they become due. 11 U.S.C.A. §109(c) (West 2012). 
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two kinds of distress. Firms in financial distress are “viable as going 
concerns, but currently having difficulty repaying debts,” or they 
“cannot meet [their] debts as they come due, but [have] a positive 
cash flow from current operations.”22 Firms in economic distress, on 
the other hand, have “low or negative operating profitability and have 
questionable going concern value even in the absence of leverage” or 
“negative cash flow.”23 Generally, firms in financial distress are proper 
candidates for restructuring under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. These firms are simply carrying too much debt, which can be 
written down in a reorganization. When a business is no longer 
sustainable as a going concern, however, it is in economic distress. 
These firms are the proper candidates for liquidation under Chapter 7 
of the Code. To determine which kind of distress a corporation faces, 
the Code essentially treats the first day of bankruptcy as the creation 
of a new firm. The new firm does not carry the debt burdens of its 
predecessor and must cover all new expenses.24 If it cannot cover new 
expenses even without the burden of its predecessor debt, it faces 
economic distress and is likely a better candidate for liquidation than 
reorganization. 
What kind of distress are states in? Arguably, this question is 
irrelevant because we cannot liquidate states.25 The available solutions 
are either to bail them out or to restructure their obligations by 
 
 22.  See, e.g., United Airlines v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(Easterbrook, J.); Michael L. Lemmon, Yung-Yu Ma & Elizabeth Tashjan, Survival of the 
Fittest? Financial and Economic Distress and Restructuring Outcomes in Chapter 11, at 1 (Jan. 1, 
2009), available at http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/10594/091w-lemmon.pdf. 
 23.  United Airlines, 416 F.3d at 612–13; Lemmon, Ma & Tashjan, supra note 22, at 1. 
 24.  United Airlines, 416 F.3d at 613; Boston & Me. Corp. v. Chi. Pac. Corp., 785 F. 2d 562, 
565 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 25. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign 
Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 905–06 (2012). The Constitution does not guarantee the continued 
existence of any given state in so many words, but numerous provisions seem to foreclose 
“liquidating” a state of the Union—at least without that state’s consent, and possibly not even 
with consent. First and foremost, Congress lacks any such enumerated power in Article I. 
Moreover, Article IV’s statement that “no new State shall be formed or erected within the 
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, 
or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned,” U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1, would put a damper on incorporating the territory of a liquidated state 
within some other more solvent state. Similarly, Article V provides “that no State, without its 
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate,” U.S. CONST. art. V, which would 
certainly be one consequence of liquidation. Finally, the Guarantee Clause obligates “[t]he 
United States [to] guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,” 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, a promise which arguably requires the U.S. to preserve a state’s 
existence for the benefit of its citizenry, even if the current leadership of a state consents to 
liquidation. 
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imposing “haircuts” or extending maturities. But the financial distress 
versus economic distress distinction helps us understand what kind of 
restructuring or bailout would be required and if it would be effective. 
Payment delays, IOUs, bailouts, and defaults can each alleviate 
financial distress, although each option is more appropriate under 
certain circumstances and each presents certain side effects. By 
comparison, only default, alteration of long-term obligations, or a 
bailout so large that it essentially transfers the liabilities can fix 
economic distress. In that circumstance, payment delays, IOUs, or a 
limited bailout will only delay eventual default or federalization of 
liabilities. 
States may experience financial distress for a number of reasons. 
State receipts—not only from taxes, but also from income on state 
assets or grants from the federal government26—may decline for 
economic reasons (the recession) or policy reasons (tax reductions, 
federal grant cutbacks). Likewise, expenditures—including wages and 
salaries of state employees, health insurance and pension costs, 
payments of social benefits such as Medicaid and unemployment, and 
interest payment on financial debt27—may increase for a variety of 
reasons. These include not only deliberate spending increases, but also 
increases in persons needing public assistance in a recession, natural 
disasters, population shifts, demographic shifts (e.g., pensioners living 
longer), and rising healthcare costs. 
A state may also be in financial distress due to a mismatch of 
maturities28 or failure of its political leaders to enact budgets in a 
timely fashion. Payment delays and IOUs can solve these kinds of 
problems. These modest forms of distress require only modest 
solutions.29 
If states are in more substantial financial distress, however, they 
will need to reduce their leverage—that is, their debt. States may 
reduce their leverage by reducing their obligations outright or by 
 
 26.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 6 n.10. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  That is, they expect revenue to come in at a later date than the date on which their bills 
are due. 
 29.  Revenue Anticipation Notes and Taxation Anticipation Notes (RANs and TANs) are 
frequently used cash-management tools that combat mismatched maturities and are not viewed 
as indicative of distress. However, when an entity cannot rollover its RANs and TANs, a classic 
liquidity crisis—the epitome of financial distress—follows. This was an issue in New York City’s 
1975 fiscal crisis. See generally Donna E. Shalala & Carol Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The 
New York Case, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1119. 
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adding assets.30 Reducing their obligations requires the states to break 
or alter promises—for example, by imposing “haircuts” on 
bondholders, reducing services to constituents, or failing to pay 
pensions and other benefits as promised to former employees. On the 
other side of the balance sheet, states have two ways to add assets. 
The first is austerity. States can cut spending, increase taxes, or both. 
The second is through some sort of bailout from the federal 
government, which may provide grants to subsidize particular state 
activities or funds to pay affected stakeholders like bondholders and 
pensioners. 
Each of these options has important downsides from a policy 
perspective. A bailout will fix the immediate problem, but potentially 
create other problems. As we discuss in Part III, the risks are familiar 
from the bank bailout of 2008, but they actually have a history going 
back to the dawn of the Republic.31 These risks include moral 
hazard—that is, if the federal government is going to pay, why should 
state politicians quit promising big pensions, healthcare, education, 
and other vote-winning services and entitlements? Likewise, if federal 
authorities are going to pay, then bondholders don’t have to price the 
risk of the state not paying them; rather, they price the risk of the 
federal government not stepping in to cover the state’s obligations. 
For nearly two centuries, the federal government has maintained a 
commitment not to bail out states. If current leaders are tempted to 
depart from that commitment, they should be mindful of the impact 
of any such departure on the structure of our federal system.32 
If the states reduce leverage by breaking promises to various 
stakeholders, we should expect predictable consequences. If the states 
break promises to bondholders, tighter capital markets should result. 
State governments will confront higher interest rates, fewer willing 
lenders, and possibly different kinds of lenders. Likewise, if the states 
default on obligations to their employees, employees may decrease 
their willingness to provide their labor at below-market wages in 
exchange for promises of a pension and other post-employment 
benefits. States may have to pay higher wages in order to attract 
 
 30.  If I have $200 of liabilities and $50 of assets, I am leveraged 4:1 ($200:$50). If I reduce 
my liabilities to $100 and maintain $50 of assets, I have halved my leverage ratio to 2:1 
($100:$50). Alternatively, if my liabilities remain the same, but I come up with $50 of additional 
assets, I have also halved my leverage ratio to 2:1 ($200:$100). 
 31. See infra notes 135–144 and accompanying text. 
 32. See, e.g., Greve, Argentina, supra note 6, at 19; RODDEN, supra note 6, at 55–67. 
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desired candidates to public-sector jobs. 
If states are in economic distress—that is, accruing liabilities at 
unsustainable rates—a bailout that adds assets on a one-time or 
limited basis will only be a band-aid. The obligations will continue to 
accrue at a rate that the state’s assets cannot cover, and additional 
assets (more federal dollars) will have to continue to be added over 
time. A one-time infusion of assets, without corresponding reductions 
in future liabilities through debt restructuring, revenue increases or 
expenditure decreases, will only postpone the problem.33 In other 
words, a bailout of an economically distressed state will only delay an 
eventual default or federalization of liabilities, whereas a bailout of a 
financially distressed state will plug a hole, hopefully enabling the 
state to become economically self-sufficient again. 
State distress poses dilemmas for creditors beyond those 
ordinarily associated with insolvency in the private sector. States are 
not corporations; they (currently) cannot file for bankruptcy. Their 
creditors cannot employ common techniques used in corporate 
insolvencies to satisfy the creditors’ debts, including equitizing their 
holdings or liquidating all of the state’s assets. It is unclear what, if 
any, enforceable remedies a stakeholder has against a state. As one 
mutual fund advisor recently explained with regard to foreign 
sovereign debt: 
When a sovereign issuer faces a solvency crisis, the willingness of 
the government to pay its creditors becomes the key issue. A 
corporation almost always wants to pay, in order for management 
to save itself. It will sell prize assets to do so. A country will not. . . .  
Ultimately, the buyer of sovereign debt is making the leap of faith 
that the borrower will repay, even when times are tough and even 
if it is not politically expedient to do so. The owner of corporate 
debt has to trust their borrower as well, but that trust can be 
enforced through the lender’s legal claims on the borrower’s assets. 
 
 33.  As an example, imagine a state that generates $100 in assets and $300 in liabilities 
every year. It has a $200 deficit. The federal government bails out the state that cannot pay its 
bills (and cannot access the bond markets) by giving it $400. In two years, if the state is not 
generating more assets (revenues), it will have used up the bailout money, but still have a deficit 
of $200 in the third year (and each year in the future). Even if revenues double to $200, the 
economically distressed state would have a $100 deficit. The eternally springing hope would be 
that the bailout would be followed by an economic rebound that would increase tax revenues 
and plug the hole between assets and liabilities. This is unrealistic given the size of the state 
budget shortfall. See supra notes 8–10. 
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We feel safer in that more tangible world of debt investing.34 
Similar insights apply to states as sovereign issuers. The remaining 
Parts of this essay explore the constitutional issues related to state 
debt. Although state government debt is generally viewed as a “safe 
bet,” American public law introduces a maze of complications when 
times turn bad. 
II. PAYMENT DELAYS, IOUS, AND ADJUSTMENTS  
TO LONG-TERM OBLIGATIONS 
We’ll pay you, just not now. A state in financial distress may simply 
choose to delay payments—on bonds, pensions, public salaries, or 
other obligations—by a fixed period of time. Cash can be paid as soon 
as it becomes available without the more complex 
redemption/payment procedures that are attached to IOUs. This may 
be an effective remedy when a state faces a mere cash-flow deficit. In 
February 2009, for example, California delayed payments of 
approximately four billion dollars for thirty days.35 The Governor and 
state legislature had not enacted a budget, and without a budget, 
California would have been $346 million in the red at the end of 
February (and $5.2 billion in the red in April). The California state 
constitution, federal law, and court rulings require California’s 
available General Fund cash to be used first to make payments 
related to education, debt service, and certain other General Fund 
payments; other payments can only be made if those protected 
creditors’ debts are satisfied. In 2009, when those required payments 
exhausted the available General Fund assets, non-protected creditors 
had to accept late payment. The State Controller’s office explained 
that payment delays were less likely to compromise the state’s access 
to credit markets than other options, such as issuing IOUs.36 
 
 
 34.  THOMAS LAPOINTE, THIRD AVENUE FOCUSED CREDIT FUND, THIRD QUARTER 
PORTFOLIO MANAGER COMMENTARY 30–31 (July 2011), available at http://www.thirdave. 
com/ta/documents/reports/3Q2011ShareholderLetters.pdf. 
 35.  See Frequently Asked Questions About Payment Delays, CALIFORNIA STATE 
CONTROLLER’S OFFICE (Feb. 2009), http://www.sco.ca.gov/february_2009_payments_faqs.html. 
 36.  Id. (“Delaying payments is a more common accounting practice used by many 
businesses when cash is less than what is needed to immediately meet their obligations. Wall 
Street recognizes that tactic and can relate the State’s use of it to the private sector.”). The 
Controller explained, moreover, that “[b]y delaying payments the State can immediately issue 
payments as soon as cash becomes available. IOUs are more complex, and the redemption 
process could delay the time it takes to transmit those funds to the recipient.” Id. 
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Illinois has resorted to payment delays more broadly, on account 
of a widening gap between expenses and revenues and the state’s 
chronic unwillingness to confront its long-term structural budget 
deficit.37 Most late payments are owed to school districts, public 
universities, and other governmental entities. The state pays a one 
percent “late fee” to nongovernmental payees who receive late 
payments. As of December 2010, Illinois estimated that approximately 
$1.5 billion in past-due bills were eligible to receive the one percent 
fine. In March 2011, Illinois established a Vendor Payment Program 
that allowed investors to buy vendors’ claims at par and then collect 
the amount owed (including the one percent fee) from the state.38 The 
purpose of this program is to transfer accounts receivable ownership 
to investors and away from service providers who may be harmed by 
late payments and forced to lay off employees or take other measures 
that may harm the general economic health of the state.39 In 2010, 
Illinois paid roughly thirty million dollars in late payment charges. 
When states like California and Illinois delay payments to 
employees and service providers, they may well find themselves in 
breach of their contractual obligations. And to the extent that state 
law cuts off any recourse for such breach, payment delays may raise 
constitutional questions. If state law effectively changes the payment 
terms of the state’s contracts, for example, that might well amount to 
“impairment” under the Contract Clause.40 Similarly, the retroactive 
imposition of such a change on obligations that the state has already 
undertaken might raise takings and due process concerns under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.41 
For most creditors whose payments have been delayed, however, 
litigation is unlikely to be a satisfactory solution. After all, litigation 
will generally take far longer to achieve any sort of result than the 
duration of the payment delay itself. Large creditors may find it 
 
 37.  Ted Hampton, Illinois’ Vendor Financing Program Underscores Severity of State’s 
Payment Delays, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE 2 (Dec. 29, 2010), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/MoodyIll.pdf. 
 38.  State of Illinois Vendor Payment Program, ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER 1 
(Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://vendorassistance.com/docs/voucher_term_sheet.pdf. 
 39.  Id. To the extent that these vendor claims are negotiable, they are like IOUs and raise 
similar problems. See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 40.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the 
obligation of contracts . . . .”). 
 41.  See E. Enters., Inc. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 536 (1998) (expressing Takings Clause 
concerns for retroactive legislation); see also infra notes 128–133 and accompanying text 
(discussing Apfel). 
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worthwhile to seek compensation for a fair rate of return on the 
money owed during the period of the delay. The Court has recognized 
a doctrine of “temporary takings,” which holds that “where the 
government’s activities have already worked a taking of all use of 
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the 
duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking 
was effective.”42 Under this doctrine, a large creditor—or perhaps a 
group of small creditors, such as public employees, aggregated into a 
class action—might seek retrospective relief even after the delay had 
ended. Alternatively, where a state has institutionalized procedures 
for late payment—as in Illinois—creditors who can show a likelihood 
of future late payments might seek prospective relief enjoining the 
operation of those procedures.43 
We’ll pay you, with interest, but for now we’re paying you in fake 
money. Instead of simply delaying payments, states may choose (and 
have chosen) to issue IOUs. IOUs are securities issued in place of 
cash, bearing interest with a short-term maturity.44 California 
structured its IOUs as a “registered warrant” as opposed to a regular 
 
 42.  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 321 (1987). The Court rejected an effort to combine First English’s doctrine of 
temporary takings with the notion that a regulatory taking of all a property’s value requires 
compensation. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 332 (2002). But a state’s delay in payment is not a regulatory taking; rather, it is an outright 
appropriation, for a limited period of time, of the creditor’s property. As such, it strikes us as 
more analogous to a “physical occupation” of the creditor’s property and therefore subject to 
far more stringent takings standards. See id. at 323–24. 
 43.  It is not easy to get a court to tell a state it cannot do something before the state has 
done it. See, e.g., O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (holding that plaintiffs in a civil rights 
class action seeking to enjoin state and local officials from treating them unfairly in the criminal 
process had not stated a case or controversy within Article III where the unfair treatment 
forming the basis of the suit had not yet occurred). The primary doctrinal barrier is ripeness, 
which requires a plaintiff seeking pre-enforcement review of government action to show that 
the issues are fit for judicial resolution and that the plaintiff will suffer hardship if required to 
wait until the law has actually been enforced. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–56 
(1967). This is generally not that difficult a burden to meet, but it becomes more difficult when 
the requested relief involves intrusion into the workings of state government. See O’Shea, 414 
U.S. at 499–502. 
 44.  When California issued IOUs in 2009, the federal Securities Exchange Commission 
issued a statement that, in the view of its staff, the IOUs were “‘securities’ under federal 
securities law.” See U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, SEC STAFF STATEMENT ON 
CALIFORNIA IOUS (July 9, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-
154.htm. “As such,” the staff noted, “holders of these IOUs and those who may purchase them 
are protected by the provisions of the federal securities laws that prohibit fraud in the purchase 
or sale of securities.” Id. This conclusion suggests that, in addition to the constitutional issues 
discussed here, federal securities law may also constrain the states’ options when they issue 
IOUs. The impact of those laws is, alas, beyond the scope of this essay. 
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warrant, which is how the state’s bills are usually paid. California has 
used IOUs twice since the Great Depression—in 1992 and 2009.45 
When the state issued $2.6 billion worth of IOUs in 2009, the 
California comptroller called them a “promise to pay,” and in fact the 
IOUs were redeemed in relatively short order.46 Prior to redemption, 
some—but not all—banks were willing to accept the IOUs as 
deposits. Otherwise, the state paid holders at maturity.47 
A variety of legal constraints limit states’ ability to use IOUs. For 
example, California’s constitution, federal laws, and court orders 
protected certain payees (education, debt service, state payroll, and 
pensions). In 1992, for example, California paid its state employee 
payroll with IOUs, but the Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled that 
California’s failure to issue paychecks on payday violated the prompt 
payment requirement under the Fair Labor Standards Act.48 In 2009, 
IOUs went primarily to private businesses, local governments, tax 
refunds, and owners of unclaimed property. 
IOUs raise similar constitutional issues to payment delays—an 
IOU, after all, is simply a delayed payment that is formally 
memorialized at the time the original payment was due and that may 
have value as a negotiable instrument in the interim between the due 
date and eventual payment. Because the state is offering something 
else in lieu of the payment that is due, however, the Contract Clause 
issues are put in stark relief. Bond contracts, for example, typically 
include a provision prohibiting the modification of interest or 
principal payments, including extending those payments, without the 
consent of each holder. Paying with an IOU can be considered a 
 
 45. See Michael M. Marois & William Selway, California Eyes IOUs for Second Time Since 
Depression, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 8, 2008, 12:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=washingtonstory&sid=a2TUhalNFDds. The 1992 IOUs paid 5% interest, and the 
2009 IOUs paid 3.75%. By comparison, the prevailing rate on a three-month CD in the 
secondary market was 3.68% and 0.55% in 1992 and 2009 respectively. See BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., HISTORICAL DATA, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases 
/H15/data.htm (last visited May 16, 2012). 
 46.  Issued beginning July 2, 2009, the IOUs were originally to be redeemed three months 
later, on October 2, 2009, but were in fact redeemed on September 4, 2009. State Controller’s 
Office Information on Registered Warrants (IOUs) Issued in 2009, CALIFORNIA STATE 
CONTROLLER’S OFFICE (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_news_registeredwarr 
ants.html. 
 47.  To the extent that the original payees may have sold their scrip at a discount to 
speculators, however, they may never have gotten full value. See Peterson & Nadler, supra note 
6, at 267 (recounting the experience of Chicago teachers paid in scrip during the Great 
Depression). 
 48.  Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537, 1544 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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modification of several terms—the maturity date, the interest rate, 
and possibly the “currency” of payment. Hence, IOUs may well 
amount to an “impairment” in violation of the Contract Clause. But 
because the short-term nature of most IOU payments render 
litigation relatively unlikely, we hold full consideration of the merits 
and remedies for such a claim until we have considered a third 
option—alteration of the states’ long-term obligations to employees 
and pensioners. 
We’ll pay you, but first we need to alter the terms of our long-term 
obligations to you. Delays and IOUs are helpful tools for dealing with 
financial stress. States in economic distress, however, may need to 
alter the terms of their obligations in more fundamental ways. In 
particular, they may need to alter long-standing agreements to 
provide pension and healthcare benefits to present and former 
employees. Many observers have pointed to these sorts of agreements 
as a basic cause of state fiscal problems,49 and we have already noted 
the massive extent of the states’ unfunded pension and healthcare 
obligations.50 Unilateral efforts by states to alter these agreements, 
however, are likely to raise difficult questions under the Contract 
Clause.51 
State and local employee benefits plans stand outside the more 
familiar federal ERISA framework that governs private employers.52 
Crucially, public employee pension and healthcare plans tend to be 
“defined-benefit” plans, under which the employer pledges to provide 
a specific benefit at a future time, while private employers have 
generally moved to “defined-contribution” plans that promise only to 
contribute certain specified amounts toward those future expenses.53 
Under a defined-benefit plan, “the burden is placed on the employer 
 
 49. See David A. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 11), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907774 (identifying “states’ pension 
obligations” as “the single greatest threat to states’ fiscal stability”); see also Miron, supra note 
8, at 3 (agreeing that pension problems are significant, but suggesting that healthcare obligations 
pose the most serious threat to state finances). 
 50.  See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
 51.  See Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. & Wesley G. Russell, Jr., 
Judicial Compulsion and the Public Fisc—A Historical Overview, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 
525, 540 (2012) (“Public sector pensions will be the litigation flashpoint in this cycle of 
austerity.”). 
 52.  See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1003(b)(1) (West 2012) 
(exempting governmental plans from the statute’s coverage). 
 53.  Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension 
Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMP. L.J. 263, 268 (2011). 
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to contribute funds to the pension plan on an actuarially sound basis 
so that sufficient funds exist to pay the worker when he or she 
retires.”54 The problem, of course, is that many if not most states and 
localities have failed to meet that burden. As a result, “[s]everal states 
will surely require substantial new revenue soon, or they will need to 
institute benefit cuts if they are to return their plans to long-term 
solvency.”55 
Not surprisingly, states are increasingly moving to reduce their 
obligations. Fourteen states have changed the rules of their plans by 
increasing the contributions required from the employee.56 And at 
least three states—Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota—have 
sought to restrict cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) to benefits for 
current retirees.57 Contract Clause litigation has ensued in each of 
these three states over the COLA reductions, as well as in New 
Hampshire over increases in employee contributions.58 
The Contract Clause was included in the Constitution primarily as 
a constraint on legislative impairment of private contracts—that is, to 
prevent states from intervening on behalf of private debtors against 
their creditors.59 Beginning with Fletcher v. Peck,60 however, the 
 
 54.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A defined-benefit plan is “fully funded” if it 
has, “at any given date, sufficient money to pay all accrued vested benefits.” Mitchell, supra 
note 11, at 59. As Professor Mitchell explains, though, this concept is “inherently a moving 
target: Future benefit projections rely on assumptions about wage increases, labor turnover, 
mortality patterns, inflation, and other factors, and asset returns are also not reliably 
forecasted.” Id. at 60. Therefore, there are discrepancies in various estimates as to how 
underfunded the states’ plans actually are. What is not in dispute, however, is that underfunding 
is a serious problem. 
 55.  Mitchell, supra note 11, at 57. 
 56.  Id. at 69. 
 57.  Id. at 69 n.24; Secunda, supra note 53, at 276; see also Jennifer Staman, Congressional 
Research Service R41736, State and Local Pension Plans and Fiscal Distress: A Legal Overview 
1 (2011) (“In 2010 alone, over 20 states introduced or passed legislation aimed to reduce or 
otherwise modify pension plan benefits for current or future retirees.”). 
 58.  See Secunda, supra note 53, at 276–83 (discussing the Minnesota, South Dakota, and 
Colorado litigation); Joey Cresta, Ruling issued in pension suit, SEACOASTONLINE.COM (Feb. 2, 
2012), http://www.seacostonline.com/articles/20120202-NEWS-202020377 (discussing the New 
Hampshire litigation). We cannot say with confidence that these are the only lawsuits, given the 
difficulty of identifying early-stage litigation in state courts. Beneficiaries may also challenge 
alterations to pension and other benefit plans under state constitutional provisions, many of 
which specifically protect pension benefits. See Cuccinelli, Getchell & Russell, supra note 51, at 
534. Although it would be a huge mistake for lawyers and policymakers to neglect these state 
constitutional protections, they are regrettably outside the scope of this essay. 
 59. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613 (2d ed. 1988) 
(stating that the “common view” of the legislative history underlying the Contract Clause 
suggests it was added to the Constitution to “protect private contracts from improvident 
majoritarian impairment”). But see James W. Ely, Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 
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Supreme Court has made it clear the Contract Clause protects public 
contracts, too.61 In the last century, the Court seemed to pull most of 
the Contract Clause’s teeth in Home Building and Loan Association v. 
Blaisdell,62 which upheld a Minnesota law that limited the ability of 
mortgage holders to foreclose on mortgagees.63 Subsequent cases have 
indicated, however, that the Clause retains some bite where public 
contracts are at issue. In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,64 the 
Supreme Court struck down legislation allowing the state to 
retroactively alter the terms of bond obligations.65 “[C]omplete 
deference,” the Court said, “is not appropriate because the State’s 
self-interest is at stake. . . . If a State could reduce its financial 
obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for what it 
regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause would 
provide no protection at all.”66 Similarly, in Allied Structural Steel Co. 
v. Spannaus,67 the Court invalidated legislation that retroactively 
altered private pension obligations. 
These cases suggest serious problems for state measures altering 
the terms of the states’ own contractual agreements with present and 
former employees (as well as for IOUs that alter those contracts’ 
payment terms). A threshold issue in each case will be whether 
pension benefits and the like are actually contractual rights or merely 
statutory entitlements that the state may alter without running afoul 
of the U.S. Constitution.68 But as the Superior Court’s thorough 
 
4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 371, 373–74 (2010) (arguing the traditional view is inaccurate, and that 
the Contract Clause was intended to protect public contracts, too). 
 60.  10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 61.  See, e.g., id. at 132–33; see also, e.g., New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 166–
67 (1812); Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 590 & n.11 (1819). 
 62.  290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 63. Id. at 428–31, 444–47; see also Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the 
Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 738 (1984) (explaining why Blaisdell was dubbed the 
“death” of the Contract Clause). 
 64.  431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 65.  Id. at 30–32. 
 66.  Id. at 26. 
 67.  438 U.S. 234, 250–52 (1978). 
 68.  See, e.g., Cuccinelli, Getchell & Russell, supra note 51, at 535–37 (discussing state-law 
variation on this point); see also Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) 
(considering whether a public school teacher’s right to tenure was contractual or statutory in 
nature for purposes of a Contract Clause claim). As cases like Brand indicate, this is a question 
of state law, but the U.S. Supreme Court may review the state court’s interpretation of state law 
on this point to ensure that the state court is not distorting state contract law in order to evade 
the enforcement of the underlying federal right against impairment. See id. at 100; see also 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 484–95 (6th ed. 
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discussion in the New Hampshire case suggests, “in more recent years, 
the majority of state supreme courts have tended to protect pension 
rights” as contractual in nature.69 On the federal side, however, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has developed a potentially 
important impediment to such claims. Although acknowledging that 
the Contract Clause’s protection extends to “contractual rights 
against the state created by legislation,” that court has required that 
“the legislature’s intent to create such rights against the state be 
unmistakably clear.”70 We have our doubts about this requirement,71 
but if adopted more broadly it could prove a substantial impediment 
to Contract Clause claims, at least where the pension benefits in 
question are created by statute rather than by ordinary contracts.72 
In states that do create contractual rights to pension and 
healthcare benefits,73 the inquiry will shift to whether the state’s law 
 
2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
 69.  Prof’l Firefighters of N.H. v. State, No. 217-2011-CV-385 (N.H. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 
2012), available at http://nh.aft.org/index.cfm?action=article&articleID=3cf8844e-b801-48fa-
9937-bb3b09617a50; see also Transp. Workers Union, Local 290 v. SEPTA, 145 F.3d 619, 623 
(3d Cir. 1998) (acknowledging this trend); Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(same). 
 70.  R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers v. Rhode Island, 357 F.3d 42, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2004) (Boudin, 
J.); see also Parella v. Retirement Bd. of the R.I. Employees’ Retirement Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 59–
60 (1st Cir. 1999); Parker, 123 F.3d at 5. 
 71.  Professor Young trembles at the very thought of disagreeing with Judge Boudin, see 
Rhode Island Brotherhood, 357 F.3d at 45–46, but it is not at all clear to us that the so-called 
“unmistakability doctrine” applies in this context. As Justice Souter observed in United States v. 
Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 879 (1996) (plurality opinion), “[t]he application of the doctrine . . . turns 
on whether enforcement of the contractual obligation alleged would block the exercise of a 
sovereign power of the Government.” A suit for damages by a government employee when the 
government unilaterally alters the terms of an employment or pension contract hardly blocks 
the exercise of sovereign power—rather, it requires the government to internalize the costs of 
its change in the law. Certainly the Supreme Court has never applied the unmistakability 
doctrine in a case like Brand. See supra note 68; see also United Healthcare Ins. Co. v. Davis, 
602 F.3d 618, 628 n.7 (5th Cir. 2010) (refusing to apply the unmistakability doctrine in a 
Contract Clause challenge to a Louisiana law altering the state’s obligations under its contracts 
with health insurance providers). Moreover, applying the federal unmistakability doctrine to 
determine whether a contract exists under state law would arguably violate the Erie doctrine. 
See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts must 
resolve issues not governed by positive federal law—that is, statutes, treaties, and the 
Constitution—according to state law); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) (arguing that Erie 
requires federal courts to apply state rules of statutory construction when interpreting state 
law). 
 72.  Judge Lynch’s opinion in Parella indicates that the unmistakability requirement may 
apply only “where a public contract allegedly arises out of statutory language.” Parella, 173 F.3d 
at 60. 
 73.  Another potentially thorny threshold issue may concern whether the plaintiffs’ 
benefits have “vested” under state law. See, e.g., Prof’l Firefighters of N.H., supra note 69, at 14–
(13) JOHNSON & YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2012 4:22 PM 
134 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 7:1 
“operated as a substantial impairment” of the contract,74 and if so, 
whether the impairment was “reasonable and necessary to serve an 
important public purpose.”75 Courts seem relatively willing to hold 
that altering employee contributions to pension plans, for example, is 
a substantial impairment.76 And although the Supreme Court rejected 
a Contract Clause challenge in Blaisdell in part on account of the 
economic emergency posed by the Depression,77 courts seem likely to 
treat invocations of emergency more skeptically when made in service 
of the state’s own self-interest. Hence, as the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court observed some decades ago, “[t]hat the maintenance of 
a retirement plan is heavily burdening a governmental unit has not 
itself been permitted to serve as justification for a scaling down of 
benefits figuring in the ‘contract,’ although no case presenting proof 
of a catastrophic condition of the public finances has been put.”78 
Similar difficulties may await under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ Takings and Due Process Clauses,79 which the Supreme 
Court has interpreted to impose significant constraints on retroactive 
legislation affecting property rights. The retroactive alterations 
involved in reducing cost-of-living increases to pension-plan benefits 
or paying some state obligations by short-term IOUs, however, may 
well be insufficiently serious to trigger those protections. For that 




23 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that they had not adequately pled that they met 
the state’s statutory vesting requirements). 
 74.  Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978). 
 75.  U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977); see Secunda, supra note 53, 
at 284 (discussing two- and three-pronged versions of the test adopted by the lower courts and 
concluding that they are equivalent in substance). 
 76.  See, e.g., Prof’l Firefighters of N.H., supra note 69, at 21 (“Legislative action increasing 
the contribution that State employees must pay constitutes an impairment of that [pension] 
contract.”); Opinion of the Justices, 303 N.E.2d 320, 329 (Mass. 1973) (opining that “[l]egislation 
which would materially increase present members’ contributions without any increase of the 
allowances finally payable to those members or any other adjustments carrying advantages to 
them, appears to be presumptively invalid”) (collecting cases); see also Secunda, supra note 53, 
at 288 (discussing the impairment standard). 
 77.  See Home Bldg. and Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (noting that 
“[w]hile emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise 
of power”). 
 78.  Opinion of the Justices, 303 N.E.2d at 329–30. 
 79.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”). 
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Even if state employees or retirees can establish a Contract 
Clause violation, tough questions remain concerning the remedy. The 
litigation arising from the first state debt crisis, in the 1790s, concerned 
actions by creditors to collect debts from states pursuant to state 
contract law. Chisholm v. Georgia80 upheld the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to hear such suits under Article III’s citizen-state diversity 
provisions, but, as Justice Souter has said in another context, “we 
know what happened.”81 The Eleventh Amendment overrode 
Chisholm by providing that 
[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.82 
The Eleventh Amendment means that creditors may not sue states for 
damages under state contract law in federal court, and state law will 
typically bar such suits in state court as well, absent an applicable 
waiver of sovereign immunity by the state.83 
A claim that state alteration of the debt contract’s payment terms 
violates the Contract Clause, however, is a federal claim under the 
Constitution, not a state contract claim. Commentators and judges 
generally agree that the Eleventh Amendment’s textual bar does not 
extend to federal question suits.84 The post-Reconstruction debt crisis 
threw up a barrier to such claims in Hans v. Louisiana,85 which held 
that state sovereign immunity barred federal courts from hearing 
Contract Clause challenges to state laws repudiating the states’ 
bonds.86 The primary exception to Hans is the principle that federal 
courts may issue prospective relief—that is, injunctions and 
declaratory judgments—against state officers who are alleged to be 
 
 80.  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 81.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 82.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 83.  See infra notes 155–161 and accompanying text (discussing waivers). 
 84.  See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1481–82 (1987); William 
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an 
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 1033 (1983); Vicki Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State 
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 44–51 (1988). 
 85.  134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 86.  Id. at 13, 19. 
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acting in violation of the U.S. Constitution.87 This may permit certain 
challenges to IOUs: a creditor might sue, for instance, to enjoin the 
issuance of IOUs that arguably impair the obligation of the 
underlying debt instruments. Similarly, beneficiaries of state pension 
plans might be able to enjoin changes to the terms of the plan from 
going into effect. But creditors and beneficiaries will generally remain 
unable to force actual payment on the original debt or obligation. As 
one of us has argued elsewhere, the general structure of American 
state sovereign immunity law is designed to prevent courts from 
compelling payment on debts that threaten the financial viability of 
the states.88 
III. BAILOUT 
We can’t/won’t pay you unless the federal government gives us the 
money. If anyone is truly “too big to fail,” surely it is a State of the 
Union.89 Despite the seeming unpopularity of bailouts in recent years, 
it would be difficult for national authorities to explain why private 
banks and car companies warranted rescuing in 2008, but California 
or Illinois do not. Über-investor Warren Buffett, for example, has 
opined that “it would be very hard, in the end, for the federal 
government to turn away a state that is having extreme financial 
difficulties when in effect it honored [the debts of] General Motors 
and various other entities.”90 As with the banks and car companies, 
federal authorities may offer the states bailouts after concluding that 
the states are not simply too big to fail, but also too interconnected 
with other aspects of the economy to fail. 
 
 87. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 68, at 
890–96. Importantly, this exception does not extend to claims for prospective relief predicated 
on a violation of state law. See generally Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 
89 (1984). 
 88.  See Ernest A. Young, Its Hour Come Round At Last? State Sovereign Immunity and 
the Great State Debt Crisis of the Early Twenty-First Century, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 
595 (2012) (describing state sovereign immunity as “one of the Constitution’s austerity 
mechanisms”). 
 89.  Some of the states, of course, are not very big at all. But Wyoming is not the state we 
are worried about in a financial distress scenario. 
 90.  Svea Herbst-Bayliss & Jonathan Stempel, Buffett: US Can Bail Out States, Insurers 
Pained, REUTERS (May 1, 2010, 4:08 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/ 
05/01/berkshire-buffett-ratings-idUSN0118355720100501; see also Jonathan Rodden, Market 
Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 11, at 123, 135 
(reporting perceptions of Mr. Buffett and other market observers that “the political importance 
of California and the externalities associated with default are simply too great to imagine a 
world in which Congress and the president allow it to default,” especially when “the federal 
government has already revealed its taste for bailouts in the private sector”). 
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Bailouts involve asset transfers from the federal government to 
distressed entities. If the federal government chose to bail out a state, 
the bailout could take the form of unrestricted fiscal assistance, 
increased funding of existing programs, or new grant or loan 
programs.91 A bailout is not the only form that federal assistance 
might take; as we discuss in Parts IV and V, Congress may legislate 
options to avoid or deal with a state default that the states probably 
could not enact on their own. We deal here with the simpler scenario 
where the national government funds or subsidizes the repayment of 
the states’ debts. 
If such a bailout does occur, it will hardly be the first time. As part 
of the famous “Compromise of 1790,” southern members of Congress 
accepted Alexander Hamilton’s proposal that the national 
government assume the Revolutionary War debts of the states in 
exchange for an agreement to locate the national capitol on the banks 
of the Potomac.92 On the other hand, the national government has 
resisted outright bailouts of the states since the 1840s, when Congress 
allowed eight states to default despite considerable pressure from 
banks and foreign creditors.93 Ten more states defaulted in the late 
nineteenth century after Reconstruction, again without federal 
intervention, and Congress allowed Arkansas to default during the 
Great Depression.94 An important school of thought in political 
economy views this “no bailout” commitment as a pillar of our fiscal 
federalism.95 
Congress has nonetheless been willing to provide financial 
assistance to beleaguered states in less transparent ways. The federal 
government has given states direct aid in three of the six recessions 
since 1973.96 Indeed, the federal government has already bailed out 
states in this recession by giving them at least $150 billion in direct 
 
 91. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 
KNOWLEDGE OF PAST RECESSIONS CAN INFORM FUTURE FEDERAL FISCAL ASSISTANCE, 
GAO-11-401, at 33–38 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11401.pdf. 
 92. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 
1789–1801, at 76–78 (1997) (providing background on the “Compromise of 1790”). 
 93.  See, e.g., RODDEN, supra note 6, at 55–63; Peterson & Nadler, supra note 6, at 266. 
 94.  See, e.g., Peterson & Nadler, supra note 6, at 267. 
 95.  See, e.g., RODDEN, supra note 6, at 49–50; Greve, Argentina, supra note 6, at 19–23; 
Peterson & Nadler, supra note 6, at 271–76. 
 96. See GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 91. In those recessions in which 
the federal government did not provide direct aid to the states, it did increase spending on 
unemployment insurance and on grants not administered by state governments. Id. 
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aid.97 The United States also provided additional direct payments in 
the Build America Bonds program, which subsidized state bonds by 
paying thirty-five percent of the interest cost directly to states.98 
The constitutional issues raised by a potential federal bailout are 
of a different order than those we have considered so far, which have 
focused on the recourse available to individual creditors. We consider 
two sorts of questions: first, what sort of conditions might Congress 
wish to impose as a predicate for federal relief, and what—if any—
constraints does the Constitution impose on such conditions? After 
all, “[c]entral governments do not offer a helping hand without at the 
same time asserting their authority . . . . If they rescue states and 
localities they will feel more than entitled to take preventative 
measures designed to preclude future defaults.”99 Second, to what 
extent might bailing out the states threaten the fiscal framework of 
our federal system? 
Two types of situations illustrate the kinds of conditions Congress 
may impose on a state seeking a bailout, and how those conditions 
may challenge our federal framework. First, imagine that California is 
Argentina and Congress is the International Monetary Fund. What 
sort of conditions would the IMF impose on a bailout of California? 
Next, imagine that California is a corporation in a cash crisis that 
needs emergency financing, and Congress is a distressed debt lender. 
What sort of conditions would a distressed debt lender put on a loan 
to California?100 We consider three types of conditions and their 
impacts on our federal framework: spending and revenue 
 
 97.  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5; Pub. L. No. 
111-226 (allowing for appropriation of ten billion dollars to state governments for education); 
Rodden, supra note 90, at 135 (“In the most recent recession, [implicit bailouts] took the form 
of special short-term Medicaid supplements and pork-laden stimulus grants for shovel-ready 
infrastructure projects in the states.”); Roger Lowenstein, Broke Town, U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/magazine/06Muni-
t.html?pagewanted=all. To see how much federal aid was given and where it went, see Track the 
Money, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/fundingoverview/Pages/ 
fundingbreakdown.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
 98. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, RECOVERY ACT: BUILD AMERICA BONDS 
(May 16, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Pages/babs.aspx.; U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY, BUILD AMERICA BONDS ARE HELPING STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS FINANCE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS AND CREATE JOBS WHILE SAVING 
TAXPAYERS BILLIONS (June 2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery 
/Documents/Build%20America%20Bonds%20Fact%20Sheet,%2006-10-10.pdf. 
 99.  Peterson & Nadler, supra note 6, at 45. 
 100.  Admittedly, the IMF and distressed debt lenders have different goals, but both 
scenarios provide interesting data points about what Congress could require of states in a 
bailout. 
(13) JOHNSON & YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2012 4:22 PM 
2012] THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF STATE DEBT 139 
requirements, modification of certain obligations (to, for example, 
public unions), and alteration of the state constitution. 
Congress might exert control over a fiscally dysfunctional state by 
requiring spending cuts and revenue expansion. These spending and 
revenue requirements could be initial conditions or milestones; that is, 
Congress could impose them before advancing any funds or could 
condition future funds on meeting Congress’s spending and revenue 
benchmarks. These future conditions, or milestones, are typical 
features of emergency financing because they give lenders control 
over a borrower. If a borrower fails to meet the lender-specified 
requirements, the lenders may withhold any remaining commitment 
amount or call a default. The IMF uses both initial conditions (“ex-
ante conditionality”) and milestones (“ex-post conditionality”) as a 
means to ensure borrower countries are able to repay the IMF.101 IMF 
conditionality, also known as Structural Adjustment Programs, often 
include currency devaluation, industry privatization, trade 
liberalization, spending cuts on social services, required deficit 
reduction, and promotion of exports.102 
It is fairly easy to imagine Congress tying its bailout money to 
spending cuts or revenue generation broadly. Perhaps such conditions 
would not strike most taxpayers as controversial. If taxpayers are 
going to lend one state their money, they may expect fiscal discipline 
to be the price paid for such benefit. A more difficult situation would 
be if Congress conditioned the bailout funds on specific spending cuts 
or manners of revenue generation. For example, Congress could 
require the state to raise taxes on cigarettes, start a lottery, cut 
spending on specified programs, or sell its state parks. 
Congress may also impose structural reforms to serve as a more 
permanent fix to chronic fiscal imbalances than its spending and 
revenue milestones can achieve. The IMF’s Structural Adjustment 
Programs, for example, have often looked to the performance and 
transparency of a state’s political system in imposing conditions for 
 
 101.  International Monetary Fund, Factsheet: IMF Conditionality (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm. 
 102.  This conditionality has been criticized. See, e.g., Jason Oringer & Carol Welch, Foreign 
Policy In Focus, Structural Adjustment Programs (Apr. 1, 1998), http://www.fpif.org 
/reports/structural_adjustment_programs; Herbert Jauch, NEWS+RESCUE, How The IMF-World 
Bank and Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) Destroyed Africa, http://www.newsrescue.com/ 
2009/05/how-the-imf-world-bank-and-structural-adjustment-programsap-destroyed-africa/#ixzz1 
tgFJwklN. In 2002 and 2009 the Fund updated its conditionality guidelines. See International 
Monetary Fund, supra note 101. 
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IMF assistance.103 It might, for example, require California to alter 
some of the dysfunctional aspects of its state constitution, such as the 
supermajority provisions that make it virtually impossible for 
California to raise certain kinds of taxes, or even its generous 
provisions for direct democracy.104 These sorts of fundamental, 
politically oriented requirements would raise the most serious 
constitutional objections. 
Both spending and revenue-generation milestones and more 
fundamental demands that a state alter its constitution can be 
analyzed as forms of conditional spending: the state does what 
Congress requires and Congress gives the state money. Such 
conditions are generally analyzed in two steps. First, we ask whether 
Congress would have the power to impose the condition directly. If so, 
we can stop there—the option of declining the money and avoiding 
the condition hardly makes the requirement more problematic.105 But 
Congress often uses conditional spending to elicit results that it could 
not mandate directly; hence, the second question is whether the 
condition nonetheless represents a valid exercise of the spending 
power. 
Many conditions that Congress might impose would likely be 
upheld at the first stage. The Supreme Court has held, however, that 
state sovereignty constrains Congress’s ability to impose conditions 
on the states that go to basic decisions of constitutional structure.106 
The Court has never explored the limits of that principle, so it is hard 
to know whether it would bar, say, a requirement that California 
 
 103.  See generally Ved P. Nanda, The “Good Governance” Concept Revisited, 603 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 269 (2006) (describing the historical experience with such 
conditions). 
 104.  See, e.g., Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo & John Joseph Wallis, Fiscal Institutions and 
Financial Crises, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 11, at 9, 38 (describing how state 
constitutional requirements of a supermajority to raise taxes, but only a normal majority to 
borrow, can create strong incentives for excessive borrowing); Andreas Kluth, The People’s 
Will, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/18563638 
(arguing that California’s lack of checks on direct democracy “stripped California naked, 
leaving it unable to respond to external shocks such as the current economic crisis”). 
 105.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 
47, 60 (2006) (“It is clear that a funding condition cannot be unconstitutional if it could be 
constitutionally imposed directly.”). In FAIR, the Court held that because Congress could 
mandate that universities allow the military to recruit on campus, the Court need not consider 
whether such a requirement would be an unconstitutional condition on the grant of federal 
funds to those universities. Id. 
 106.  See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (holding that Congress could not 
require Oklahoma to choose a particular location for its state capital). 
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change its constitution to facilitate future tax increases. Given the 
centrality of taxing and spending decisions to democratic 
governance,107 however, federal requirements that states alter their 
constitutional frameworks for fiscal policy would present a serious 
test of Congress’s authority. 
The Court has also suggested—albeit a very long time ago—that 
the Constitution limits Congress’s power to control state tax policy.108 
Although the Constitution imposed some limits on state collection of 
imports and exports, the states’ “power of taxation . . . remains entire  
. . . [and] absolute.”109 Accordingly, the Court said, state legislatures 
retain discretion as to “[t]he extent to which it shall be exercised, the 
subjects upon which it shall be exercised, and the mode in which it 
shall be exercised.”110 “That discretion is restrained only by the will of 
the people expressed in the State constitutions or through elections, 
and by the condition that it must not be so used as to burden or 
embarrass the operations of the national government.”111 In particular, 
“[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which contemplates or 
authorizes any direct abridgment of this power by national 
legislation.”112 The Court made these statements in 1869, and federal 
law now interacts with state tax policy in myriad and complex ways. 
But it is still possible to imagine the Court balking at federal 
requirements purporting to direct state tax policy.113 
If Congress lacks power to impose restructuring conditions 
directly, it may nonetheless do so as a condition on optional grants of 
federal funds. Contemporary doctrine analyzes this second step under 
South Dakota v. Dole,114 which upheld Congress’s requirement that 
states raise their minimum drinking age to twenty-one as a condition 
on receiving five percent of their federal highway funds. Dole 
 
 107.  See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Fiscal Federalism and the Limits of Bankruptcy, in WHEN 
STATES GO BROKE, supra note 11, at 214, 228 (“[T]he long-standing normative choice 
embodied in the structure of American government and law is that distributional decisions 
beyond a constitutionally mandated baseline—the ultimate political choice—should be made by 
electorally responsive bodies.”). 
 108.  See generally Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869) (refusing to read 
federal law as requiring state officials to accept state tax payments in national currency rather 
than coin). 
 109.  Id. at 77. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not 
“commandeer” state legislatures). 
 114.  483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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required that spending conditions (1) be in pursuit of the “general 
welfare,” (2) be clearly stated, (3) be “germane” to the purposes of the 
underlying spending, (4) not require the recipient state to take action 
that would itself be unconstitutional, and (5) not be coercive.115 A 
condition requiring certain revenue or spending milestones, or a state 
constitutional amendment to remove impediments to revenue 
increases, would likely encounter difficulty only with the fifth prong: 
the Court has considered the “general welfare” requirement largely 
nonjusticiable; the condition could presumably be stated clearly; such 
a condition would plainly be related to the bailout’s purpose of 
restoring the state to fiscal health; and it is hardly unconstitutional for 
a state to raise taxes or cut spending. But the dire financial straits 
giving rise to the need for a bailout and the likely scale of the federal 
financial assistance involved would present a far more powerful case 
for coercion than that in Dole. Nonetheless, the Court has found 
coercion only once, in New York v. United States,116 and the 
circumstances of that case were so odd that it may not provide much 
guidance in future situations.117 
 
 115.  See id. at 207–08, 211 (outlining the constitutional requirements for spending 
conditions). 
 116.  505 U.S. 144 (1992). Coyle also involved a condition on a federal benefit—Oklahoma’s 
admission to the Union. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1911). The Court nonetheless 
asked only whether the condition could be imposed as a direct mandate, because the “equal 
footing” doctrine required that Oklahoma be subjected only to requirements that could be 
imposed on states already admitted to the Union. See id. at 566–68. 
 117. See, e.g., ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, THE TEA PARTY: THREE PRINCIPLES 73–74 (2012) 
(acknowledging that “[c]oercion claims aren’t getting any traction [in the current healthcare 
litigation] for the simple reason that the Supreme Court in Dole provided no guidance about 
how to know when federal strings cross the line from encouragement to coercion”). New York 
involved the anti-commandeering doctrine, which holds that Congress may not require the 
states to implement federal law, rather than an effort by Congress to use conditional spending to 
accomplish an object outside its enumerated powers. See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not require state executive officers to implement federal 
law). The anti-commandeering doctrine does not forbid voluntary state implementation, and so 
the question was whether the inducement for the states to implement the Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Act was so coercive that the statute should be treated as imposing a direct 
mandate. Under the Act, states choosing not to cooperate in implementing the federal 
regulatory scheme were obligated to “take title” to all the low level radioactive waste generated 
within their jurisdiction, and the Court (not surprisingly) held that this was coercive. See New 
York, 505 U.S. at 174–77. Like we said, it is an odd case. 
As this essay goes to press, the Supreme Court is considering a coercion-based challenge to 
provisions of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that expand the 
states’ obligations under Medicaid. See Greve, Argentina, supra note 6, at 32–34 (discussing 
these aspects of the PPACA). Although the Spending Clause arguments have generally taken a 
backseat to the Commerce Clause challenge to the PPACA’s so-called “individual mandate,” 
see generally Stephen E. Sachs, The Uneasy Case for the Affordable Care Act, 75 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 17 (2012) (focusing on the mandate), the Supreme Court devoted a whole hour of 
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It is also not obvious that anyone would want to challenge the 
terms of a bailout under Dole. The recipient states, after all, will have 
consented. The persons most likely to complain about such a measure 
would be taxpayers in more solvent states, but the Court has generally 
not recognized federal taxpayer standing,118 and in any event those 
taxpayers would be asserting the rights of third parties (the recipient 
states) in challenging the deal.119 However, the Court has made clear 
that states accepting conditional federal benefits are not estopped 
from challenging the conditions imposed if they should later think 
better of their bargain. This is because the structural federalism 
principles that limit the spending power benefit not just the state 
governments themselves but also individual citizens; as a result, states 
lack the power to waive these protections.120 A prudent federal official 
ought to assume that any bailout will have to withstand scrutiny 
under Dole. 
A bailout might also require the states to alter some of their 
obligations to public-sector unions, pension holders, and the like. 
Here, the question is not the fifth prong of Dole (coercion) but rather 
the fourth—that is, whether the condition would require the state 
itself to violate the Constitution. And a condition requiring the state 
to renege might violate that requirement by raising Contract Clause 
problems that we have already discussed.121 These problems might be 
avoided if the federal bailout legislation were to directly preempt the 
state agreements that Congress wishes to modify, because the 
Contract Clause by its terms applies only to the states.122 To be sure, 
there is strong Supreme Court precedent suggesting that the United 
States is bound to honor its own contracts in much the same way that 
 
argument—that is, the full time that most cases get—to the Medicaid expansion. See Lyle 
Denniston, Argument preview: Health care, Part IV—The Medicaid Expansion, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Mar. 23, 2012, 12:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/argument-preview-health-care-
part-iv-the-medicaid-expansion/. It is possible that the Court’s resolution of this challenge will 
clarify or even alter the existing framework for conditional spending analysis. Or not. 
 118.  See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 68, at 120–22. 
 119. See generally, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding that prudential 
standing principles barred plaintiffs from asserting the rights of third parties not before the 
court). 
 120.  See New York, 505 U.S. at 182 (“Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the 
States . . . the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state 
officials.”).  
 121.  See supra notes 58–78 and accompanying text. 
 122.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . make any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”). 
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states, under the Contract Clause, are bound to honor theirs.123 But a 
federal statute relieving states of certain obligations in their contracts 
with private parties would not implicate that principle. As the Court 
explained in Perry v. United States,124 “[t]here is a clear distinction 
between the power of the Congress to control or interdict the 
contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise of its 
constitutional authority, and the power of the Congress to alter or 
repudiate the substance of its own engagements.”125 Federal legislation 
altering the terms of states’ contracts would look a lot more like 
Blaisdell—that is, a government altering, for public policy reasons, the 
terms of agreements to which it is not a party.126 
The more formidable challenge to federal abrogation of state 
contracts would come from the Takings and Due Process Clauses.127 
The Supreme Court has made clear that retroactive legislation that 
affects valid property interests raises problems under both these 
clauses. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,128 the Court struck down the 
Coal Act, which imposed retroactive liability for healthcare benefits 
to coal industry retirees on companies that had employed those 
retirees in the past. The Court divided over the appropriate theory in 
that case. Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality of four Justices, 
concluded that the Coal Act worked an uncompensated taking of 
property because it imposed a “considerable financial burden” on 
Eastern, interfered with Eastern’s “reasonable investment backed 
expectations,” and unfairly singled out particular companies to bear 
the burdens imposed by the Act.129 Most important, Justice O’Connor 
stressed that “[r]etroactivity is generally disfavored in the law . . . in 
accordance with ‘fundamental notions of justice’ that have been 
recognized throughout history.”130 Any federal bailout legislation 
 
 123.  See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350–54 (1935) (holding that Congress 
lacked power to override the obligation of a federal bond); cf. United States v. Winstar Corp., 
518 U.S. 839, 875–76 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“Although the Contract Clause has no 
application to acts of the United States, it is clear that the National Government has some 
capacity to make agreements binding future Congresses by creating vested rights.”). 
 124.  294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 125.  Id. at 350–51. 
 126.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 127.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
 128.  524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
 129. Id. at 529–37. 
 130. Id. at 532 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp v. Bonjourno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Justice O’Connor cited a wide range of authorities, both ancient 
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conditioned on altering pension obligations would affect pensioners’ 
property interests.  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Apfel identified a distinct 
ground for challenging retroactive legislation under the Due Process 
Clause: “Although we have been hesitant to subject economic 
legislation to due process scrutiny as a general matter,” he noted, “the 
Court has given careful scrutiny to due process challenges to 
legislation with retroactive effects.”131 Because the Coal Act imposed 
retroactive liability on Eastern, it violated due process.132 Similarly, a 
court may reason that federal bailout legislation imposing retroactive 
burdens on certain parties—reducing their pension benefits, for 
example—also violates due process. 
What is even more striking about Apfel, however, is that while the 
four dissenters would have upheld the Coal Act, they all joined Justice 
Breyer’s opinion insisting that retroactive legislation should be 
subjected to careful judicial scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. 
That opinion was quick to disavow claims that all economic legislation 
should receive great deference from the courts: “Insofar as the 
plurality avoids reliance on the Due Process Clause for fear of 
resurrecting Lochner v. New York . . . and related doctrines of 
‘substantive due process,’” Breyer wrote, “that fear is misplaced. . . .  
[A]n unfair retroactive assessment of liability upsets settled 
expectations, and it thereby undermines a basic objective of law 
itself.”133 Rather than applying the “rubber stamp” approach with 
which the Court has traditionally reviewed most economic legislation 
since the New Deal,134 the dissenters engaged in a searching analysis 
 
and modern. See id. at 533 (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
§ 1398 (5th ed. 1891) (“[R]etro-spective laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has been 
forcibly said, neither accord with sound legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the 
social compact.”)). 
 131.  Id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Apfel rejected the plurality’s Takings Clause analysis on the ground 
that the Coal Act did not implicate a specific property interest; Eastern’s liabilities under the 
Act were to be paid out of general funds, so the Act operated much like any other tax. Id. at 
539–47. But that distinction would not apply to a federal bailout condition requiring states to 
abrogate or restructure their contractual obligations to creditors or pensioners; such a condition 
would retroactively eliminate specific interests in particular contracts or benefits. One must 
worry, therefore, that Justice Kennedy would be willing to find a taking in litigation challenging 
this sort of requirement. 
 132.  Id. at 550. 
 133.  Id. at 557–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 134.  See generally Ernest A. Young, Sorrell v. IMS Health and the End of the Constitutional 
Double Standard, 36 VT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing the Court’s post-New Deal 
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of the Coal Act’s impact and objectives. The crucial takeaway from 
Apfel, then, is that all nine Justices expressed profound concerns 
about retroactive legislation that upsets investment-backed 
expectations. Surely state pensioners, who have invested their careers 
in the state government expecting the pensions the state promised, 
would have a strong case under this principle if their expectations 
were to be thwarted by federal legislation. 
Federal legislation that seeks to alter the states’ pension and 
healthcare obligations in order to alleviate the states’ economic 
distress is thus likely to encounter significant constitutional hurdles. 
And state laws abrogating or significantly altering those obligations, 
perhaps enacted as a predicate to a bailout, would encounter the same 
objections under the Fourteenth Amendment. Without some means of 
reducing the structural causes of the states’ distress, however, it is 
hard to see a bailout getting through Congress. No legislator wants to 
be seen as giving a blank check to fiscally improvident state 
legislators. 
This linkage between federal assistance and federal control 
highlights the second and more systemic constitutional issue with 
bailouts: their potential impact on America’s system of fiscal 
federalism. There are basically two ways to organize spending and 
borrowing authority in a federation: the central government can 
exercise hierarchical control over borrowing and spending by the 
subunits, or it can leave those subunits fiscally sovereign—that is, free 
to make their own borrowing and spending decisions. If the 
federation takes the first approach, then the central government will 
generally be responsible for the subunits’ fiscal health and will 
guarantee their debts. This is the system that Alexander Hamilton 
advocated when he sought to use the post-Revolutionary War debt 
crisis as “an opportunity to centralize fiscal authority” in the new 
Republic,135 and it is the situation in most federal systems around the 
world today.136 
In the absence of hierarchical controls, however, it is critical that 
the central government commit not to bail out the subunits. 
Otherwise, as Jonathan Rodden has demonstrated, the federation 
 
deference to economic legislation challenged on due process grounds). 
 135.  Rodden, supra note 90, at 124. 
 136.  See Peterson & Nadler, supra note 6, at 255 (“Except in Canada and Switzerland [and 
the U.S.], state debts in all federal systems in the industrialized countries of the world are 
implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the federal government.”). 
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faces “a basic moral hazard problem”: “When the central and lower-
level governments both have authority to tax and spend, individual 
lower-level governments can harbor the belief that unsustainable 
fiscal burdens will ultimately be borne by other members of the 
federation through bailouts.”137 If markets perceive a bailout as likely, 
they will continue lending to subnational governments at rates that 
reflect not the subunit’s solvency, but rather that of the central 
government. The subunits will thus remain largely free of market 
discipline, which may further increase incentives for unsustainable 
policies and compound pressures for a central bailout. Only a credible 
commitment by the national government not to bail out the subunits 
can ensure the operation of market-based checks on state fiscal 
policy.138 
Ever since Congress allowed several states to default in the 1840s, 
its “no bailout” commitment has been perceived as highly credible. 
Professor Rodden’s recent analysis of state bond yields, credit default 
swaps on state debt, and state credit ratings, for example, 
demonstrates that financial markets continue to assess the 
creditworthiness of states individually and have not “priced in” an 
assumption that the national government would bail states out in the 
event of a default.139 Nor have state officials behaved as if they expect 
such a bailout; rather, “state governments are making serious efforts 
at reform” rather than “throwing up their hands, staying the course, 
and placing all of their bets on a federal bailout.”140 
To be perfectly honest, we find all this continued confidence in the 
U.S. government’s no-bailout guarantee a bit puzzling. One reason, as 
already noted, is that Administrations of both parties and Congress 
have already proven willing to bail out private entities, such as 
General Motors and various banks. But more fundamentally, the 
relationship between the national and state governments is 
profoundly different today than it was in the 1840s. Then, the state 
and national governments operated in largely separate spheres, and 
both did relatively little. Nowadays, we live in an era of activist 
government, and most federal programs incorporate an important 
implementation role for the states through various “cooperative 
 
 137.  Rodden, supra note 90, at 124. 
 138.  See id. at 131–33 (arguing that a firm no-bailout commitment increases the spending 
discipline of states). 
 139.  Id. at 137–40. 
 140.  Id. at 140. 
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federalism” arrangements.141 Two aspects of these arrangements are 
critical for present purposes: first, the national government now 
depends on state governments to achieve its regulatory and social 
welfare goals;142 and second, much state spending is now driven by 
federal matching-funds arrangements and other federal 
requirements.143 These developments both increase the pressure on 
Congress to bail out state governments and give rise to a plausible 
argument that it is only fair for Congress to do so. 
What to do about this situation is one of the most profound 
questions of our federalism, and we cannot purport to answer it here. 
Our point is simply that policymakers considering what to do about 
state debt should be aware of the way that this particular policy 
dilemma ties into the more fundamental structural issues. Congress’s 
commitment not to bail out the states has played a critical role in 
maintaining the states’ fiscal sovereignty, and that commitment 
appears to retain significant credibility with both state officials and 
financial markets. At the same time, surrounding changes in the 
federal-state relationship have undermined many of the assumptions 
on which the no-bailout commitment rests. Whether one views a 
federal bailout as the last nail in the coffin of our federalism or a 
necessary step to a sounder, more Hamiltonian arrangement, 
policymakers should heed Sergeant Esterhaus’s famous advice from 
Hill Street Blues: “[L]et’s be careful out there.”144 
IV. DEFAULT AND REPUDIATION 
We won’t pay you now, and we may never pay you. It is not hard to 
imagine a scenario in which the states cannot meet their financial 
obligations, cannot raise revenue, and no bailout is forthcoming. Since 
1840, after all, the national government has generally been willing to 
let states fail.145 The last state to default on general obligation bonds 
 
 141.  See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668–72 (2001). 
 142.  See id. at 671 (“[B]y the federal government’s own admission, it is almost always 
unwilling and/or unable to take back the power to implement cooperative federalism 
programs.”). 
 143.  See Greve, Argentina, supra note 6, at 29–32 (outlining how state spending responds to 
federal incentives). 
 144.  Memorable quotes for “Hill Street Blues”, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title 
/tt0081873/quotes (last visited May 22, 2012). 
 145.  See generally RODDEN, supra note 6, at 57–63 (describing how the federal government 
resisted calls to bail out the states in the 1830s and 1840s); William B. English, Understanding 
the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State Debts in the 1840’s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259 
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was Arkansas in 1934, during the Depression.146 More famously, 
“[m]ost of the States of the Old Confederacy,” especially Louisiana 
and our own dear North Carolina, repudiated their Reconstruction-
era debt in the late nineteenth century.147 With a little help from the 
Supreme Court’s willingness to reinterpret the Eleventh Amendment, 
they largely got away with it.148 In light of this history, we must 
consider the possibility that states may choose to forgo principal 
and/or interest payments on their bonds, fail to pay pensioners, or 
even repudiate certain debts outright. Although the consequences of 
default may pose a greater deterrent today, it would be a mistake to 
dismiss the possibility of default entirely. 
Consider the following scenario: as a state’s financial prospects 
darken and a default becomes more likely, current holders of state 
debt are likely to sell their stake to investors with higher risk 
appetites—that is, “vulture” funds that speculate in distressed assets. 
It would become politically unattractive to call for austerity and 
sacrifice on the part of retirees to pay hedge funds at par plus interest 
when those investors paid pennies on the dollar for the bonds. At 
some point, the political pendulum might well swing, and voters 
would call for repudiation. 
To be sure, a repudiating state would suffer dire consequences in 
the capital markets. Its bond rating would plummet, and it might find 
itself unable to raise further capital for some period of time.149 But if a 
state can determine it does not need access to capital markets for 
some period, it may determine it is politically better to default. For 
example, Dennis Kucinich presided as mayor over a “default” of 
Cleveland’s bank debt by letting Cleveland go into bankruptcy 
instead of selling a public utility—a decision that was politically 
damaging at the time but now seems to be viewed more favorably in 
 
(1996) (analyzing the nineteenth-century defaults). 
 146.  In that case, the bondholders were eventually paid in full, albeit with a little federal 
help. See generally Joe Mysak, Bond Default Is About Too Much Debt, Too Little Time, 
BLOOMBERG (July 20, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-21/bond-default-means-
too-much-debt-too-little-time-commentary-by-joe-mysak.html. 
 147.  See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 78 (1987). 
 148.  See, e.g., id. at 58–89; see also Cuccinelli, Getchell & Russell, supra note 51, at 532–33. 
 149.  See RODDEN, supra note 6, at 63 (recounting that, after the defaults of the 1840s, the 
defaulting state governments were unable to access capital markets for a time); English, supra 
note 145, at 268 (“Rather than direct sanctions, the cost of default appears to have been loss of 
access to new loans.”). 
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hindsight.150 
Repudiation of a state’s bonds is surely unconstitutional under the 
Contract Clause. The question is whether bondholders have any 
prospect of a remedy. As we have already discussed,151 state sovereign 
immunity poses a formidable bar to recovery on debt contracts by 
private plaintiffs. Conventional wisdom holds that such recovery will 
be virtually impossible in the unfriendly forum of state court.152 
Although two Mississippi courts in the 1840s found that the state was 
legally and morally bound to the payment of repudiated bonds,153 that 
result is certainly the exception and not the rule. Federal court offers 
a potentially friendlier forum, but the Eleventh Amendment bars 
state-law suits where federal jurisdiction rests on citizen-state 
diversity of citizenship, and the Amendment’s “penumbra” bars 
federal question suits predicated on the Contract Clause.154 
Two possible avenues might permit federal-court suits in the event 
of state-bond defaults. The first is waiver. Notwithstanding the 
wording of the Eleventh Amendment as a constraint on federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction, which is ordinarily unwaivable, the 
Supreme Court has long held that states may waive their sovereign 
immunity from suit.155 Some state bonds actually include a waiver of 
sovereign immunity in the bond contract itself. We have found such 
waivers, for example, in bonds issued by North Carolina,156 
 
 150. See Audrey Chapman, Dennis Kucinich: The Story, CLEVELAND MAGAZINE (May 




 151.  See supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text. 
 152.  See, e.g., English, supra note 145, at 261 (commenting that the state court route “seems 
unpromising, given the likely unpopularity of the bondholders”). However, to the extent that 
state bonds are frequently held by a state’s own citizens in the modern era, see Rodden, supra 
note 90, at 136, the prediction of state-court hostility may be overblown. 
 153.  WILLIAM A. SCOTT, THE REPUDIATION OF STATE DEBTS 39 (1893); English, supra 
note 145, at 261. As Professor English notes, however, the successful state plaintiffs still found 
themselves unable to collect on their judgment. See id. 
 154.  See generally, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (commenting that the phrase “Eleventh Amendment immunity” is 
“something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is 
limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment”). 
 155. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447–48 (1883); HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 68, at 882–84. Subject-matter limitations are not ordinarily subject to waiver by the parties 
to a suit. See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884). 
 156.  DEPARTMENT OF STATE TREASURER IN RELATION TO $487,700,000, STATE OF 
NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL OBLIGATION PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT BONDS, SERIES 2010A, at 3 
(Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EA380429-EA299102-EA694765.pdf. 
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Massachusetts,157 and Minnesota.158 Where such waivers are 
unavailable, it may be possible to fit a bond suit into a more general 
waiver of immunity in contract suits, analogous to the general federal 
waiver in the Tucker Act.159 The problem with both specific and 
general waivers is that they will be construed as only applicable to 
suits in state court unless the waiver specifically says otherwise.160 They 
may, in other words, get creditors a hearing, but it will not ordinarily 
be a hearing in federal court.161 
Congress may, however, seek to induce states to waive their 
immunity more broadly for bond suits in federal court,162 perhaps by 
conditioning federal financial aid on such waivers. Like other 
spending conditions, an induced waiver of state sovereign immunity 
would be analyzed under Dole’s five-part test.163 In general, courts 
have been unwilling to strike down state immunity waivers under this 
test.164 As a result, a Congress that was inclined to help state creditors 
 
 157.  A recent issue of Massachusetts bonds states that “[t]he Commonwealth has waived its 
sovereign immunity and consented to be sued on contractual obligations, including the Bonds, 
and all claims with respect thereto.” THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, GENERAL 
OBLIGATION BONDS CONSOLIDATED LOAN OF 2011, SERIES E (Dec. 20, 2011), available at 
http://emma.msrb.org/ER546508-ER423338-ER825473.pdf. 
 158.  A recent notice for Minnesota’s general obligation bonds includes the following 
waiver: 
Waiver of Immunity: Under Minnesota Statutes, Section 3.751, the State has waived 
immunity from suit with respect to the controversies arising out of its debt obligations 
incurred pursuant to Article XI of the Minnesota Constitution, and has conferred 
jurisdiction on State District Courts to hear and determine such controversies. 
Accordingly, if the State fails to pay in full the principal of and interest on the Bonds 
when due, a holder of a Bond on which principal or interest is past due is entitled to 
commence an action in the District Court for Ramsey County, Minnesota, to enforce 
the pledge of the State’s full faith and credit to the payment of such principal and 
interest. 
STATE OF MINNESOTA, GENERAL OBLIGATION STATE BONDS (Sept. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.mmb.state.mn.us/doc/bonds/notice-sale/2010/fos.pdf. 
 159. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.50.250 (West 2012) (“A person or corporation 
having a contract, quasi-contract, or tort claim against the state may bring an action against the 
state in a state court that has jurisdiction over the claim.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985); Smith v. Reeves, 
178 U.S. 436, 441–45 (1900). 
 161.  See supra note 152 and accompanying text (explaining that state courts have generally 
been viewed as unreceptive to claims by state creditors). 
 162.  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999). 
 163. See supra notes 114–117 and accompanying text; see generally Mitchell Berman, R. 
Anthony Reese & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property 
Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1037 (2001) 
(discussing how induced waivers of state sovereign immunity in intellectual property cases might 
play out under Dole). 
 164. See, e.g., Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding, under 
Dole, a federal spending condition requiring a waiver of sovereign immunity). 
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in the event of a state-bond default might well be able to induce states 
to waive their immunity from suit in federal court in return for federal 
aid. 
The second avenue—statutory abrogation of immunity—would 
likewise require congressional assistance. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,165 the 
Supreme Court held that Congress may override or abrogate the 
states’ sovereign immunity, notwithstanding the Eleventh 
Amendment, when it acts pursuant to its power to reinforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments.166 Although the Court has aggressively 
expanded the scope of state immunity since Fitzpatrick, it has 
repeatedly reaffirmed this principle.167 The question then becomes 
whether a state’s repudiation of its debt is a constitutional violation 
that Congress may remedy under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Contract Clause, alas, is neither part of the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor incorporated therein through subsequent 
judicial decisions, but the Due Process and Takings Clauses are. To the 
extent that state repudiation of debt works a retroactive impairment 
of vested property rights (by, for example, modifying pension 
obligations), Congress may well have the authority to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity in private suits challenging such impairments.168 
At the end of the day, reputational effects—and their concomitant 
impact on a state’s future access to the capital markets—remain the 
most significant check on state defaults. Looking back on the state 
debt defaults and repudiations of the 1840s, William English 
concludes that “reputation effects appear to have been sufficient to 
induce most states to repay.”169 Although this essay focuses on legal 
structures and remedies—the authors are lawyers, after all—it is well 
to remember that law is not the only constraint. 
 
 165.  427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
 166.  Id. at 456. 
 167.  See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 756. 
 168.  See generally, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that Congress had 
successfully abrogated state sovereign immunity, pursuant to Section Five, in enacting Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, insofar as that act required access to the courts); Nev. 
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that Congress successfully 
abrogated state sovereign immunity, pursuant to Section Five, in the Family and Medical Leave 
Act); see also Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State Sovereign 
Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1570–81 
(2003) (book review) (offering an interpretation of the requirements for Section Five 
abrogation). 
 169.  English, supra note 145, at 272. 
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V. BANKRUPTCY 
We’ll pay you, but less than full value and according to a plan 
approved by a federal court. The idea of a bankruptcy procedure for 
sovereign states dates back to Adam Smith,170 but the States’ recent 
financial troubles have brought the idea once again to the fore. 
Academics like David Skeel and Steven Schwarcz,171 as well as 
politicians like Jeb Bush and Newt Gingrich,172 have suggested that 
Congress should extend the federal bankruptcy regime to offer relief 
to state governments. A rapidly developing literature assesses these 
proposals,173 and we attempt no comprehensive discussion here. 
Rather, we seek only to flag the most salient issues. 
We begin by considering the ways in which the constitutional 
framework affects the traditional rationales for bankruptcy. Sovereign 
immunity largely obviates the primary rationale for private-sector 
bankruptcy—the need to avoid collective-action problems as multiple 
creditors seek to collect from the debtor.174 Although some 
commentators continue to emphasize the need to eliminate holdout 
problems in renegotiating the terms of state debts,175 proponents have 
stressed “the reduction of debt overhang as the principal justification 
for a bankruptcy framework for states.”176 These proponents also 
acknowledge that the continuing institutional autonomy of the state 
(and its resulting continued accountability to its citizens) must be a 
principal value in a state bankruptcy process; in valuing the 
continuing autonomy of the debtor, state bankruptcy is thus more like 
individual bankruptcy than its more familiar corporate form.177 
 
 170.  See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 920 (R.H. Campbell, Andrew S. Skinner & W.B. Todd eds., 1976) (1776). 
 171.  See generally Skeel, supra note 49; Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State 
‘Bankruptcy’, 59 UCLA L. REV. 322 (2011). 
 172.  See Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Op-Ed, Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 
2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/opinion/la-oe-gingrich-bankruptcy-
20110127. 
 173.  In addition to the sources cited in note 171, supra, see also, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 
25; Levitin, supra note 107; George G. Triantis, Bankruptcy For the States and By the States, in 
WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 11, at 237. 
 174.  See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 25, at 898 (observing that “immunity blunts or eliminates 
traditional collective action problems that have come to motivate bankruptcy”); Skeel, supra 
note 49, at 4. 
 175.  See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 171, at 327–31. 
 176.  Skeel, supra note 49, at 9. “Debt overhang” exists when “[a] debtor . . . find[s] it 
impossible to borrow funds, even if it has promising future prospects, [because] it has a large 
amount of existing debt.” Id. at 7. 
 177.  See id. at 8 (“State sovereignty and its analogue for individuals, autonomy, imply a 
presumption—perhaps nearly a conclusive one—that debt overhang problems must be solved in 
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A federal bankruptcy scheme appears to offer two primary 
advantages in reducing a state’s debt overhang. First, like the bailout 
conditions that we considered in Part III, it provides a federal rule to 
trump impediments to the adjustment of state debts.178 Under the 
Supremacy Clause, federal law would preempt state constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing various state obligations, and federal 
requirements would likewise probably avoid the Contract Clause’s 
constraints on state impairments of state governmental obligations.179 
Unlike a conditional bailout, however, a federal bankruptcy 
mechanism would presumably not be accompanied by an infusion of 
federal resources to help pay the creditors; indeed, state bankruptcy 
proponents frequently present it as a way to forestall the temptation 
for Congress to bail out the states.180 Moreover, rather than 
incorporating adjustments to state obligations in a set of federal 
statutory conditions accompanying a bailout, a bankruptcy law would 
create an ongoing process of negotiation and accommodation 
overseen by a federal court. 
The second advantage stems from the suggestion that a 
bankruptcy procedure might reduce “dysfunctional decision making” 
that leads to and exacerbates state financial crises.181 By providing an 
alternative to federal bailouts, a bankruptcy law would require states 
to borrow at a rate that reflects the actual risk of default—without 
any implicit promise of a federal rescue. This, proponents argue, 
would decrease “lawmakers’ temptation to fund current spending 
with borrowed funds.”182 Proponents also hope that “bankruptcy 
would counteract the political agency costs that have exacerbated 
 
order to free up the debtor’s future prospects.”); see also Gelpern, supra note 25, at 909 (“The 
missing link between contracts, capital structure, and governance makes states more like 
individuals, whose autonomy is a paramount value.”). 
 178.  See Michael W. McConnell, Extending Bankruptcy Law to States, in WHEN STATES GO 
BROKE, supra note 11, at 229 (observing that “[t]he principal advantage of bankruptcy, under 
current fiscal circumstances” would be to allow governments “to force renegotiation of 
contractual obligations such as pay, retirement, pensions, and health care”). 
 179.  See supra notes 121–125 and accompanying text. 
 180.  See, e.g., David Skeel, A Bankruptcy Law—Not Bailouts—For the States, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 18, 2011, at A17. 
 181.  See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 49, at 9; see also Levitin, supra note 107, at 224 
(“Bankruptcy could function as a political tool in several ways. It could serve as a political 
discipline mechanism; provide cover for politically unpopular decisions; serve as a convening 
mechanism to facilitate negotiations; and facilitate negotiations by setting baseline rules and 
alternatives.”). 
 182.  See Skeel, supra note 49, at 11. 
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states’ pension problems.”183 By moving ultimate adjustment of 
pension obligations out of the state political process, where 
beneficiaries of these obligations may exert undue political influence, 
state bankruptcy might give beneficiaries an incentive to insist that 
pensions be adequately funded in the first place.184 Even if these 
predictions prove accurate, however, it is not clear that bankruptcy 
would address the root dysfunctions that lead to state financial 
crises.185 
Most state bankruptcy proposals have been limited to voluntary 
participation by state governments, presumably in order to avoid 
constitutional difficulties. In his contribution to this symposium, 
however, Adam Feibelman boldly goes where no other scholar has 
gone before—he proposes a mandatory bankruptcy regime for state 
governments.186 The primary virtue of a mandatory regime over a 
voluntary one, he argues, is that it would prevent states from waiting 
too long to file. “[T]he benefits of allowing states to file for 
bankruptcy,” Professor Feibelman argues, “could be slight compared 
to the costs that states will incur and externalize as a result of their 
delay in voluntarily seeking relief.”187 Feibelman’s proposal is 
“extreme” in a helpful sense because it brings to the fore some 
constitutional considerations that might otherwise have remained 
submerged. For that reason, his proposal is a valuable contribution to 
the ongoing conversation about state debt. 
That doesn’t make it constitutional, however. We might begin by 
asking, what is the enumerated power that authorizes Congress to 
subject states to bankruptcy proceedings? We doubt it is the 
bankruptcy power, because sovereign debt has long been understood 
to raise unique problems outside the purview of bankruptcy; certainly 
the Founders’ discussions of state debts in the Federalist papers and 
 
 183.  See id. at 12. 
 184.  Id. But see Levitin, supra note 107, at 225 (warning that “[i]t is impossible to say . . . 
whether [taking debt negotiations out of the political process] enables politicians to look out for 
the commonwealth rather than to be beholden to narrow rent-seeking interests or merely gives 
politicians the ability to reach deals of personal convenience without regard to their 
constituents’ interests”). 
 185.  See Levitin, supra note 107, at 219–20 (arguing that the states’ budget problems are 
structural in nature, arising from a mismatch between the states’ countercyclical spending 
obligations and state constitutional restrictions on borrowing and budget deficits). 
 186.  Adam Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 81 (2012). 
 187.  Id. at 82. 
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at the state ratifying conventions188 would have been different if they 
thought that the Constitution authorized Congress to establish 
bankruptcy procedures for states.189 Congress would most likely have 
to fall back upon its power to regulate commerce—after all, states sell 
bonds, purchase services, and engage in other commercial activities in 
a national market. The question then would be whether the commerce 
power can be understood to include the power to regulate the states’ 
own finances.190 
Our objection at this point begins to sound not so much like a 
denial of national enumerated power, but rather like an assertion of 
an immunity from national regulation grounded in some aspect of 
state sovereignty. This is an underdeveloped area of constitutional law. 
The Court has suggested at times that the “states as states” retain 
certain residual rights of sovereignty that the national government 
may not invade even when acting pursuant to an enumerated power. 
In Coyle v. Smith,191 for example, the Court held that Congress may 
not tell a state where to put its capitol. Under current jurisprudence, 
the anti-commandeering doctrine may be described as protecting a 
state’s sovereign right to choose what laws it will make and 
implement.192 It is not at all clear what other aspects of state 
governmental independence might also be off-limits to federal 
intrusion. 
 
 188.  See, e.g., CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY 18–40 (1972) (describing the debates at Philadelphia and in the state ratifying 
conventions over whether the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses of Article III abrogated the states’ 
sovereign immunity). If Article I’s bankruptcy power had been thought to confer power on 
Congress to subject states to bankruptcy proceedings, one would think that Anti-Federalists 
worried about the states being forced to pay their debts would have focused their opposition on 
Article I, not Article III. 
 189.  One might also question whether a sui generis bankruptcy procedure for states would 
fall under Article I’s authorization to “establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of 
bankruptcies,” Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added), although perhaps that stricture is satisfied so 
long as the rules apply to all state governments “throughout the United States.” Id. 
 190.  Even if that power is not enumerated in Article I, it might nonetheless be considered a 
“necessary and proper” means to some other enumerated end, such as maintaining the general 
health of the interstate economy. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (construing the Necessary and Proper Clause very broadly). But see 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (suggesting that there are, in fact, limits on the reach of the “necessary and proper” 
power). 
 191. 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
 192. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (suggesting that the 
doctrine can be understood either as an implicit limit on the enumerated powers or as a part of 
the states’ residual sovereignty). 
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Mandatory bankruptcy, however, may well fall within the 
forbidden zone. The Court’s decisions on municipal bankruptcy—in 
Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. One193 and 
United States v. Bekins194—both contain language suggesting that a 
mandatory provision for states would be problematic. Ashton struck 
down a municipal bankruptcy statute under the Tenth Amendment, 
stating (without much elaboration) that the law “might materially 
restrict [a state’s] control over its fiscal affairs.”195 Two years later, 
Bekins upheld an amended version of the same law, but again stressed 
the constitutionally sensitive nature of the subject: 
The statute is carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon the 
sovereignty of the State. The State retains control of its fiscal 
affairs. The bankruptcy power is exercised in relation to a matter 
normally within its province, and only in a case where the action of 
the taxing agency in carrying out a plan of composition approved 
by the bankruptcy court is authorized by state law.196 
Professor Feibelman points out that all of these statements are 
arguably dicta,197 and their vintage—the two cases were decided a year 
on either side of the Court’s famous 1937 “switch in time”—makes it 
hard to say how they would fit into contemporary federalism 
jurisprudence. But requiring states to submit to the jurisdiction of a 
federal bankruptcy court and conform to a reorganization plan 
adopted by creditors and approved by the court seems to pose a 
significant intrusion on state sovereignty.198 The problem would be still 
more stark if such a plan required the state to take measures like 
raising taxes. In particular, the intervention of the bankruptcy court 
would sever or at least undermine the link between state policy and 
 
 193. 298 U.S. 513 (1936) 
 194. 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
 195. Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530. In dissent, Justice Cardozo stressed the voluntary nature of the 
provision: 
The question is not here whether the statute would be valid if it made provision for 
involuntary bankruptcy, dispensing with the consent of the state and with that of the 
bankrupt subdivision. For present purposes, one may assume that there would be in 
such conditions a dislocation of that balance between the powers of the states and the 
powers of the central government which is essential to our federal system. 
Id. at 538 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
 196.  Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51. 
 197.  Feibelman, supra note 186, at 106. 
 198.  See McConnell, supra note 178, at 234 (concluding that, “viewed realistically, state 
bankruptcy would cut deeply into the inherently sovereign powers of the state over taxation and 
expenditure”). 
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the democratic preferences of the state electorate.199 
In assessing these cases, it matters that the Supreme Court has 
long since abandoned any general prohibition on federal regulation of 
state governmental functions. The Court had adopted such a 
prohibition—although a tentative and messy one—in National 
League of Cities v. Usery,200 but it jettisoned that doctrine a decade 
later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.201 
Garcia’s reasoning is nonetheless instructive for Professor 
Feibelman’s proposal. The Garcia majority rejected National League 
of Cities’ implicit constitutional protection for state sovereignty on 
the ground that the constitutional structure protects states through 
their representation in Congress.202 Hence, when Congress acts, it is 
with the consent of the states’ representatives.203 Garcia thus ushered 
in an era of “process federalism,” under which judicial review eschews 
substantive line-drawing in favor of reinforcing the “political 
safeguards” of federalism.204 
A mandatory state bankruptcy scheme is problematic from this 
standpoint, because rather than having Congress regulate the states 
directly—as the federal law upheld in Garcia did, and as a conditional 
bailout might—it would delegate authority to restructure state 
finances to a federal court. While the states are represented in 
Congress, they have no analogous representation within the federal 
judiciary. Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment and two centuries of state 
sovereign immunity doctrine rest in large part on the view that 
federal courts are unfriendly to state governments, especially when 
they are sued on their debts. Although Garcia allows Congress to 
regulate the states’ governmental operations, it is not nearly so clear 
that Congress may turn over control of state financial decisions to 
 
 199. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (“Accountability is . . . 
diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance 
with the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”). 
 200.  426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that Congress could not regulate the traditional 
governmental functions of the states). 
 201.  See 469 U.S. 528, 532 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities). 
 202.  Id. at 546–47. 
 203.  See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 
559 (1954). 
 204.  See generally Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 
1349 (2001) (examining whether the protection of federalism should be a subject of judicial 
review or of political processes). 
(13) JOHNSON & YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2012 4:22 PM 
2012] THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF STATE DEBT 159 
federal judges.205 
Finally, there is the small matter of state sovereign immunity. Any 
mandatory state bankruptcy scheme would involve an abrogation of 
state sovereign immunity and therefore encounter problems under 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,206 which held that Congress generally may 
not override state immunity when acting pursuant to its Article I 
powers. The Supreme Court did step back from Seminole in Central 
Virginia Community College v. Katz,207 which held that the states may 
be subjected to federal damages liability, notwithstanding the 
Eleventh Amendment, in bankruptcy cases.208 In that case, however, 
the state had been made a party to a bankruptcy proceeding involving 
a private business, on the ground that the state community college 
had received a preferential transfer of money in the debtor’s estate.209 
Subjecting the state itself to bankruptcy would involve a far greater 
incursion on state sovereignty.210 Moreover, it is hard to know how 
seriously to take Katz, given how hard it is to square with Seminole, 
Alden v. Maine,211 and the Court’s other immunity precedents. Now 
that Justice O’Connor—the only member of the Seminole and Alden 
 
 205.  Use of the federal bankruptcy courts, as they are presently constituted, might add an 
additional layer of constitutional doubt. The Court’s recent decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. 
Ct. 2594 (2011), which held that non-Article III bankruptcy judges may not finally determine 
state counterclaims that arise in bankruptcy cases, raised fundamental questions as to when 
Article III permits Congress to employ federal judges that lack life tenure and salary protection. 
To the extent that federal statutory law would govern the restructuring of state debts in a 
bankruptcy proceeding, Stern may raise no Article III bar. And it is unclear, from a process 
federalism perspective, which way federal bankruptcy judges’ lack of independence should cut. 
After all, to the extent that such judges are accountable to Congress, which may eliminate their 
positions by statute, that would actually ameliorate the federalism difficulties posed by a state 
bankruptcy procedure (while perhaps raising viable constitutional objections for the states’ 
creditors). Given the uncertainty surrounding the permissible scope of bankruptcy judges’ 
authority under Article III, Congress might prefer to have state bankruptcies be adjudicated 
before regular district judges. 
 206.  517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 207.  546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
 208.  Id. at 379. 
 209.  Id. at 360. 
 210.  See Gelpern, supra note 25, at 899 n.29 (noting that “the prevailing reading [of Katz] 
remains narrow, limited to states’ role as creditors in bankruptcy proceedings”); The Role of 
Public Emp. Pensions in Contributing to State Insolvency and the Possibility of a State Bankr. 
Chapter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of the Nat’l Bankr. Conference) (“The [Katz] 
decision does not imply that any State waived sovereign immunity with respect to itself as a 
debtor or that any State, in adopting the Constitution, agreed that another State may be a 
debtor in a bankruptcy case.”). 
 211.  527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign 
immunity, pursuant to its Article I powers, for suits brought in state court). 
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majorities to join Katz—has left the Court, it is not clear that Katz 
would be followed, much less extended, today.212 
The likelihood that mandatory bankruptcy for states is 
unconstitutional leaves, of course, the possibility of voluntary 
bankruptcy as proposed by Professor Skeel, Messrs. Bush and 
Gingrich, and others.213 Voluntary state participation may obviate 
many or even all of the arguments we have considered in this Part,214 
but only if we consider the states’ sovereign interests to be waivable. 
As Michael McConnell has explained, the answer depends on what 
we consider federalism to be for: 
If federalism protects states’ rights, then it follows that an entity 
that has rights ought to be able to waive those rights. . . .  
Alternatively, if federalism diffuses power and thus provides a 
check against tyranny and oppressive centralized authority, then 
the state should not be able to waive this central structural aspect 
of federal constitutionalism.215 
Although some aspects of state sovereignty—like sovereign 
immunity—remain waivable,216 the Court has increasingly suggested 
that others may not be. In New York v. United States,217 for instance, 
the Court held that while states may voluntarily agree to implement 
federal law, their earlier acquiescence could not waive their right to 
challenge such laws under the anti-commandeering doctrine.218 And 
last term, in Bond v. United States,219 the Court held that individuals 
have standing to raise Tenth Amendment challenges to federal laws 
because “[t]he limitations that federalism entails are not . . . a matter 
of rights belonging only to the States.”220 
This question may not have a categorical answer; rather, the 
validity of a voluntary state bankruptcy scheme may well turn on the 
 
 212.  Cf. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (refusing to 
extend the rationale of Hibbs and holding that Congress did not successfully abrogate the states’ 
sovereign immunity with respect to the self-care provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act). 
 213.  See supra notes 171–173 and accompanying text. 
 214. But see Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 
VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that consent cannot empower the government to do 
things it would otherwise lack power to do). 
 215.  McConnell, supra note 178, at 234. 
 216.  See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 217.  505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 218.  See id. at 181–82 (holding that because “federalism secures to citizens the liberties that 
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power,” it followed that state officials “cannot consent to 
the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution”). 
 219.  131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). 
 220.  Id. at 2364. 
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institutional details of how it operates.221 From a pragmatic standpoint, 
as Professor McConnell points out, “the sovereign interests of the 
public might . . . be better served by breaking the stranglehold of old 
contracts, even at the cost of submission to the scrutiny of federal 
bankruptcy judges.”222 That it might be constitutional for a state to 
submit to bankruptcy jurisdiction, however, would not necessarily 
mean that, by so consenting, the state could delegate its taxing and 
spending authority to the bankruptcy court.223 Taxing and spending do 
not necessarily lie outside the constitutional limits of judicial power 
per se.224 Nonetheless, federal municipal bankruptcy law has 
traditionally denied those sensitive powers to the bankruptcy court,225 
and including them in an already-intrusive state bankruptcy regime 
might push any such scheme over the constitutional line.226 Moreover, 
even if the overall scheme is valid, some orders that a bankruptcy 
court could issue—such as a “haircut” for state creditors—might 
implicate the Contract Clause and/or Takings Clause issues that we 
have discussed earlier.227 
 
 
 221.  Moreover, in analyzing the validity and scope of state consent, one would need to look 
not only to the federal but to the state constitution, because a state can hardly consent to 
something that its own constitution forbids. 
 222.  McConnell, supra note 178, at 235. 
 223.  See Gelpern, supra note 25, at 910–11 (“Neither bankruptcy judges nor contractual 
creditors have the democratic legitimacy to compel revenue measures.”); McConnell, supra note 
178, at 236 (suggesting that any valid state bankruptcy scheme “must ensure . . . that the 
democratic process and not the judiciary retains control over the states’ fundamental taxing and 
spending decisions”). 
 224.  See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990) (“[A] court order directing a local 
government body to levy its own taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal 
court.”). Jenkins cited “a long and venerable line of cases in which this Court held that federal 
courts could issue the writ of mandamus to compel local governmental bodies to levy taxes 
adequate to satisfy their debt obligations.” Id. at 55–56 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor 
and Council of New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170 (1909); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 
(1906); Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1881); United States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381 
(1879); Heine v. Levee Comm’rs, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 655, 657 (1874); City of Galena v. Amy, 72 
U.S. (5 Wall.) 705 (1867); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867); Bd. of 
Comm’rs of Knox Cnty. v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376 (1861)). 
 225.  See Levitin, supra note 107, at 226 (“Traditionally, bankruptcy courts have not had the 
power to order tax increases or even rate increases for public utilities.”). 
 226.  A preferable approach might be to empower the bankruptcy court to enjoin the 
operation of state laws that prevent necessary taxing or spending, while leaving the actual 
execution of the tax or spending to state authorities. Cf. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51–52 (holding that 
the district court should have pursued this course in a desegregation case rather than imposing a 
tax increase by its own order). Such an injunction would remain an extraordinary exercise of 
federal power, particularly if the enjoined state tax or spending limits are not themselves 
unconstitutional. 
 227.  See supra notes 121–133 and accompanying text. 
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Our final point is that, while many of the constitutional 
impediments to state bankruptcy that we have discussed are quite 
formal in nature, they may well make good functional sense. As Anna 
Gelpern observes, “[b]ankruptcy is at best unproven, and at worst 
unsuited to overtly political tasks, such as mediating among political 
interest groups and brokering fiscal federalism.”228 Sovereignty-based 
protections for state governments are, at bottom, meant to guarantee 
that the political organs of state governments decide important 
questions affecting the lives of their constituents—and that those 
constituents can hold state government democratically accountable 
for those decisions.229 As dysfunctional as state governments may 
sometimes seem, it is far from clear that unelected generalists on the 
federal bench can make superior financial decisions, much less that 
those decisions will be perceived as legitimate by affected state 
citizens. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Students of federal jurisdiction who care about state governance 
and finances are at risk of living out the famous Chinese curse:230 
“May you live in interesting times.” In this essay, we have sought to 
identify some of the key constitutional issues that will complicate any 
effort to deal with the burgeoning crisis of state debt. As in much of 
the law of federal jurisdiction, the law rarely cuts off all remedies or 
precludes all meaningful reform, but it repays attention to history and 
doctrinal detail. Many of these issues are far too complex to permit 
any sort of definitive treatment here, and on some agreement remains 
elusive even among specialists. We hope simply to have sketched out a 




 228.  Gelpern, supra note 25, at 895; see also Levitin, supra note 107, at 224 (concluding that 
“[b]ankruptcy cannot fix the underlying cyclical structural problem in states’ budgets”). 
 229.  See Young, Its Hour Come Round, supra note 88, at 620–21 (explaining how sovereign 
immunity “implicate[s] the States’ capacity to exercise self-governance”). 
 230.  Which may not actually be Chinese. See Nicholas D. Kristof, A Chinese Curse? N.Y. 
TIMES (Sep. 24, 2008), http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/a-chinese-curse/. 
